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ABSTRACT
More than a century ago, William Morton Wheeler proposed that social insect colonies can be regarded as
superorganisms when they have morphologically differentiated reproductive and nursing castes that are analogous to
the metazoan germ-line and soma. Following the rise of sociobiology in the 1970s, Wheeler’s insights were largely
neglected, and we were left with multiple new superorganism concepts that are mutually inconsistent and uninformative
on how superorganismality originated. These difficulties can be traced to the broadened sociobiological concept of
eusociality, which denies that physical queen–worker caste differentiation is a universal hallmark of superorganismal
colonies. Unlike early evolutionary naturalists and geneticists such as Weismann, Huxley, Fisher and Haldane, who set
out to explain the acquisition of an unmated worker caste, the goal of sociobiology was to understand the evolution of
eusociality, a broad-brush convenience category that covers most forms of cooperative breeding. By lumping a diverse
spectrum of social systems into a single category, and drawing attention away from the evolution of distinct quantifiable
traits, the sociobiological tradition has impeded straightforward connections between inclusive fitness theory and the
major evolutionary transitions paradigm for understanding irreversible shifts to higher organizational complexity. We
evaluate the history by which these inconsistencies accumulated, develop a common-cause approach for understanding
the origins of all major transitions in eukaryote hierarchical complexity, and use Hamilton’s rule to argue that they are
directly comparable. We show that only Wheeler’s original definition of superorganismality can be unambiguously linked
to irreversible evolutionary transitions from context-dependent reproductive altruism to unconditional differentiation
of permanently unmated castes in the ants, corbiculate bees, vespine wasps and higher termites. We argue that strictly
monogamous parents were a necessary, albeit not sufficient condition for all transitions to superorganismality, analogous
to single-zygote bottlenecking being a necessary but not sufficient condition for the convergent origins of complex soma
across multicellular eukaryotes. We infer that conflict reduction was not a necessary condition for the origin of any of
these major transitions, and conclude that controversies over the status of inclusive fitness theory primarily emanate
from the arbitrarily defined sociobiological concepts of superorganismality and eusociality, not from the theory itself.
Key words: superorganism, eusociality, major evolutionary transitions, sociobiology, inclusive fitness theory, monogamy
hypothesis, single-cell bottleneck.
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To be useful, the superorganism metaphor must be consistent. It should
illuminate aspects of social insect biology hitherto overlooked and provide
explanations based on organisms that are useful for understanding
features of the superorganism. (Page & Mitchell, 1993)
[T]here is something appealing about ‘eusocial’ that kept expanding its
horizons, while reducing its precision. I see it used popularly everywhere
as jargon, by now meaning no more than simply ‘social.’ (Batra, 1995)
I. INTRODUCTION AND AIMS
Are eusocial colonies superorganisms? Since the 1980s, an
increasing number of biologists have argued in favour of this
idea. In fact, talk of superorganisms has become so common-
place that their existence is taken for granted (e.g. Lumsden,
1982; Seeley, 1989; Moritz & Southwick, 1992; Heinze,
Ho¨lldobler & Peeters, 1994; Moritz & Fuchs, 1998; Amdam
& Seehuus, 2006; Detrain & Deneubourg, 2006; Tautz, 2008;
Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 2009; Alaux, Maisonnasse & Le Conte,
2010; Gillooly, Hou & Kaspari, 2010; Johnson & Linksvayer,
2010). This lack of scrutiny matters little when emphasizing
that social insects need to be studied both from the level of
the colony and the animals that compose them. However,
starting with Wheeler (1911), superorganism claims have also
been used to convey the idea that some insect colonies repre-
sent a distinct level of organization above metazoan multicel-
lularity. Formulated this way, superorganismality becomes
shorthand for a macro-evolutionary hypothesis that such
colonies may represent an entirely distinct type of life. Reach-
ing superorganism status then becomes analogous to other
major transitions, such as the convergent evolution of obligate
multicellularity, as in animals, plants, some fungi, and some
algae (Grosberg & Strathmann, 2007; Fisher, Cornwallis &
West, 2013; Lang & Rensing, 2015). The claim that colonies
are superorganisms is a strong assertion, so there should be
no ambiguity about which social organisms have and have
not made this transition. However, incoherent definitions
and casual use of terminology have made it difficult to make
such decisions and to identify the origins of major transitions.
This lack of clarity has hindered the development of a uni-
fied account of social evolution across the levels of biological
organization.
All superorganisms identified by Wheeler (1911) are
presently considered to be eusocial, which is commonly
taken to imply that they have: (i) cooperative brood care,
(ii) reproductive division of labour, and (iii) overlap of adult
generations. This three-part eusociality definition has been
widely used for over four decades, but few have noticed
that in setting it out in the first pages of The Insect Societies,
Wilson (1971) broke with earlier zoological classifications
of social organization. The term eusociality was originally
formulated to describe only ground-nesting halictid bees
whose nest foundresses recruit some daughters as helpers.
It did not refer to social insects in general, and particularly
not to those with physically differentiated castes (Batra,
1966a). The broadened definition (Wilson, 1971, 1975,
1985) made it impossible for lineages with permanent castes
to be considered fundamentally more advanced than, and
hence distinct from, those with temporal and plastic helper
phenotypes. This problem was first identified when Peeters
& Crozier (1988, p. 284) noted that caste, as redefined
by Wilson (1985), had simply become ‘a set of colony
members, smaller than the total colony population, that
specialize on particular tasks for prolonged periods of
time’. The new eusociality definition contrasted with the
explicit acknowledgement of the evolutionary importance
of physical queen–worker caste differentiation by Darwin
(1859), Weismann (1893) and Wheeler (1911, 1928a), as
well as modern (neo-Darwinian) synthesis architects such as
Fisher (1930) and Huxley (1930). It is thus opportune to ask
why the field did not continue using the term eusociality
for monomorphic cooperative breeding in matrifilial nests
permanent enough to accommodate more than a single
generation (Batra, 1966a), and superorganismality (Wheeler,
1911) for colonies with physically polymorphic queen and
worker castes. New superorganism concepts were developed
in the 1980s, but without reference to the scientific
advances that allegedly undermined the original version
of Wheeler (1911) which treated obligatorily co-dependent
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germ–soma specialization of castes as a crucial evolutionary
innovation.
Because discussions of eusociality and superorganismality
often make reference to major evolutionary transitions, it
is important to be explicit about what these are. We follow
Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry (1995) in considering them
to be evolutionary changes in hierarchical complexity that
involve both a loss of independent breeding and higher-level
adaptations to more inclusive levels of organization. How-
ever, we maintain that, to be major, such transitions must also
be defined as evolutionarily irreversible. This occurs when
obligate differentiation between germ and soma functions
can be unambiguously identified, and switches to higher lev-
els of heritability and ontogeny are completed. Evolutionary
changes of this type require fundamentally new develop-
mental pathways to become established and go to fixation,
occasionally allowing secondary (usually parasitic) reductions
but no reversals to ancestral free-living states. With rare
exceptions (West et al., 2015), the point that major transitions
need to be phylogenetically irreversible has been at best
tentatively admitted because of no evidence to the contrary
(e.g. Szathma´ry & Maynard Smith, 1995; McShea, 2001;
Bourke, 2011a). The necessity of making irreversibility an
explicit, testable assumption of the major evolutionary tran-
sitions paradigm is obvious when such transitions also create
fundamentally novel and permanent assemblies of what
Cosmides & Tooby (1981) coined ‘co-replicons’. These are
formerly self-replicating units that retain distinct reproduc-
tive interests even after reproducing with other co-replicons
has become mandatory due to irreversible morphological
specialization. The paradigmatic example of a partnership
between co-replicons is the origin of the first eukaryote cell,
defined as an egalitarian major transition by Queller (2000).
For the social insects, transitions were fraternal rather than
egalitarian, as they concern the same gene pool (Queller,
2000). Such transitions have recently been re-associated
with point of no return origins of physically differentiated
castes (Wilson & Ho¨lldobler, 2005). This allowed reference
(Wilson & Wilson, 2007) to the general major transitions
framework (Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry, 1995), but
this acknowledgement of the evolutionary significance
of morphological castes stands in direct opposition to
the sociobiology-inspired conception of eusociality that
all but erased the importance of distinct queen–worker
polymorphism some four decades ago (Wilson, 1975, 1985;
Sherman et al., 1995).
Because multiple modern concepts of superorganismality
coexist in the literature with Wheeler’s (1911) original
version, they cannot all correctly identify the points of no
return that demarcate the origins of major evolutionary tran-
sitions. Resolving this ambiguity is important because our
understanding of the evolutionary forces that have shaped
biological complexity should not be based on arbitrary
constructs, but on rigorous procedures that first parse social
phenotypes into biologically meaningful groups defined by
the presence or absence of evolutionarily important traits,
and then unambiguously assess the point of no return clicks of
the evolutionary ratchet that constitute major transitions. As
we summarized above, the modern literature on superorgan-
ismality, eusociality, and major transitions has fundamental
ambiguities that preclude a unified view of the evolutionary
history of eukaryotic hierarchical complexity which the
architects of the modern synthesis had no problem seeing.
Re-reading their contributions is reminiscent of exploring
an intellectual fossil record, because their inferences about
social evolution were almost never cited after the 1950s.
Yet, they rarely strike the modern reader as being mistaken
because of data that we have and they lacked, so there must
be some other reason these works were lost in the second half
of the 20th century, and this deserves to be made explicit.
Our present review confronts 40 years of sociobiology
heritage with the need to be coherent about eusocial-
ity, organismality, superorganismality and irreversibility, as
demanded by the first epigraph (Page & Mitchell, 1993), and
in sharp contrast to what has actually happened, according
to the second epigraph (Batra, 1995). To do so, we review the
origin and later modifications of the superorganism concept
to show that all later versions are imprecise compared to
Wheeler’s (1911) original, and unsuitable for capturing the
origins of major transitions, a focus that has been surprisingly
neglected (but see Bourke, 2011a; Clarke, 2014). We then
proceed to outline that the parallels between the points of
no return to complex multicellular organismality and colo-
nial superorganismality are even more striking than Wheeler
(1911) imagined, and that all major hierarchical transitions
since the last eukaryote common ancestor (LECA) appear to
hinge on (super)organismal foundation principles that always
create maximal relatedness among adhering cell copies or
colonial siblings – a predicted and confirmed pattern that
forges coherent general connections with inclusive fitness the-
ory (Hughes et al., 2008; Fisher et al., 2013). Finally, we discuss
why intra-(super)organism conflict reduction is relevant for
secondary elaborations but not for major transition origins,
and how the ‘just so’ definitions of sociobiology have fuelled
fruitless debates that would probably not have arisen if the
earlier, more-coherent definitions of eusociality and superor-
ganismality had been retained. We conclude that hypotheses
which purport to provide insight into the evolution of Wil-
son’s unspecified eusociality have not been, and cannot be,
validated because such an artificial behavioural category
does not respond to selection – only distinct biological traits
such as the expression of reproductive altruism, and the
proximate mechanisms that give rise to caste phenotypes do.
A brief historical overview of the five key concepts
addressed in these introductory paragraphs is given in
Table 1 to provide context for our more comprehensive
review of the superorganism in the sections that follow.
To facilitate understanding of the shifting ways in which
key authors have conceived and handled the concepts of
(eu)sociality and (super)organismality over a period of almost
125 years, we have also compiled a list of more than 50
numbered quotations that we refer to with qE (eusociality),
qS (superorganismality) and qN (non-social insects) prefixes
throughout the text (Table 2).
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Table 1. The five concepts analysed in this review
Superorganism: originally a sociological term introduced by Spencer (1885) to argue that human societies have organism-like
properties. The term remained a facile unscientific concept until Wheeler (1911) referred to insect colonies in which all members
belonged to one of several morphologically distinct castes as ‘organismal’, and later called them ‘superorganismal’, to emphasize that
they represent a distinct domain of social evolution beyond metazoan multicellularity. Subsequent versions of the superorganism lost
connection to physical caste differentiation, which reinstated Spencerian connotations of unspecified harmony at all biological scales
(e.g. Emerson, 1952). This purportedly led to the demise of the superorganism concept in the 1950–1960s. Different kinds of
superorganism concepts arose in the late 1980s, but without clear definitions (Seeley, 1989; Wilson & Sober, 1989). In this review we
categorize these new concepts as sensu lato and sensu stricto superorganismality capturing, respectively, the idea that either all or only the
most evolutionarily derived social insect colonies are assumed to be superorganismal (Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 2009).
Eusociality: a term coined by Batra (1966a). It originally referred exclusively to subsocial (mother–offspring) associations in
ground-nesting halictid bees, i.e. to very small insect families lacking any sort of morphological division of labour. Later, the term was
generalized to characterize most forms of social breeding (Michener, 1969; Wilson, 1971, 1975, 1985, 2012, 2014; Batra, 1995). It is
generally unknown that Huxley (1930, p. 10) coined the term ‘true social, or colony, grade’ in 1930 to refer to the same type of social
organization identified by the Batra (1966a) definition of eusociality. He received no credit for this, which we redress herein.
Major transitions in evolution: a concept developed by Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry (1995) to highlight the fact that life has
increased in hierarchical complexity over time, starting with molecular replicators that produced chromosomes and prokaryote cells,
which in turn gave rise to the first eukaryote ancestor, various independent forms of obligate multicellularity and finally colony-life
with physically differentiated queen and worker castes. The concept was further elaborated by Queller (2000), who noted that
transitions could be either fraternal or egalitarian. Before Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry (1995), Buss (1987) and Bonner (1988) had
attempted independent analyses of the advancement of biological complexity, and during the first decades of the 20th century, Huxley
(1912) developed the contours of a similar framework, but this contribution appears to have been ignored by later authors.
Sociobiology: a comparative narrative developed by Wilson (1971, 1975) (see also Oster & Wilson, 1978) and defined as ‘the systematic
study of the biological basis of all forms of social behavior’ that is ‘based to a substantial degree on population biology, including the
ecology and genetics of populations, and thereby stresses not only behavior but also the demography and structure of whole societies.’
(Wilson, 1983, p. 552). The approach was greeted with controversy, but became well known among professional academics and the
lay-public, despite contributing little to the development of new testable evolutionary hypotheses, or the further advancement of social
evolution theory from first principles. This contrasts with the field of behavioural and evolutionary ecology that developed
simultaneously (Krebs & Davies, 1978, 1984, 1991, 1997; Trivers, 1985; Cockburn, 1991; Dawkins, 1999), which is often mentioned
jointly with sociobiology.
Inclusive fitness: a first-principle theory developed by Hamilton (1963, 1964a,b, 1972) for explaining the evolution and maintenance of
cooperation, altruism, spite and selfishness (West, Griffin & Gardner, 2007). The early insights of Hamilton were used approvingly by
Williams (1966), who offered the first synthetic treatment of biological adaptation based on universal ‘gene’s eye’ arguments after
Darwinism and Mendelism had been reconciled (Cronin, 1991; Boomsma, 2016). Inclusive fitness theory allows for the formulation of
many testable hypotheses about social adaptations, based on maximizing the representation of genes coding for relevant social
behaviours in future generations via direct reproduction, and/or indirect reproduction through relatives. The theory became fully
mature after key contributions by Trivers (1974), Trivers & Hare (1976), Hamilton (1975), Cosmides & Tooby (1981), and Grafen
(1984) and more recently, Queller (1996), Frank (1998) and Grafen (2014). Inclusive fitness theory and its universal gene-copy
currency was made accessible to a wide readership by Dawkins (1976) around the same time that sociobiology (Wilson, 1975) was
introduced and debated. The actual process by which the indirect component of inclusive fitness is maximized is known as kin
selection (Maynard Smith, 1964).
II. HISTORY
(1) The early history of the superorganism: how
Wheeler’s concept became neglected
The first misconception we intend to address is the notion
that Wheeler’s (1911) superorganism concept was initially
embraced by other social insect researchers, fell out of
favour after 1950 (Wilson, 1967, 1971; Lumsden, 1982;
Wilson & Michener, 1982; Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 1990;
Page, 2013), and was resurrected in the 1980s. Our review
of the early 20th-century literature appears to support a
different reading. Wheeler began drawing comparisons
between ant colonies and metazoans (Wheeler, 1902)
(Table 2, qS2) a decade before he explicitly stated that
insect colonies are organisms when they have permanent,
morphologically differentiated castes (Wheeler, 1910, 1911)
(Table 2, qS3 and qS4). In doing this, he stood on the
shoulders of giants such as August Weismann (Table 2,
qE1, qE2 and qS1), and later had the support of R.A.
Fisher and Julian S. Huxley (Table 2, qE4, qS5 and qS8),
two co-founders of the modern (neo-Darwinian) synthesis.
As summarized by Mitchell (1995), Wheeler noted that
(super)organismal colonies behave as ‘unitary wholes’, have
differentiated germ (reproductive) and soma (worker) lines,
and develop both ontogenetically and phylogenetically over
time (Table 2, qS2–4, qS6 and qS7). His position was not
simply that colonies resemble organisms, or that treating
them as such can be a useful idealization. He believed
that colonies are organisms in the full sense of the word
(Table 2, qS4). In later works he began to use the now
familiar superorganism terminology (Wheeler, 1928a), but
his underlying views remained unchanged (Table 2, qS6 and
qS7). The assumption that superorganismality constitutes a
domain of social evolution that is analogous to, but distinctly
beyond/above (the meaning of the Latin prefix ‘super’)
animal zygote-derived multicellularity, was always central
to Wheeler’s reasoning (Table 2, qS2–4, qS6 and qS7).
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Table 2. A chronological sample of relevant quotes on (eu)sociality (qE1–qE23) and insect colony superorganismality (qS1–qS25)
found in the literature since the 1890s, with indications of primary taxonomic affiliation and generality, supplemented with
representative quotes of extensions of the superorganism concept outside the realm of social insects (qN1–qN7) that have clouded
transparency
Eusociality, including earlier and later social classification schemes
qE1. Social: (insects; Weismann, 1893, p. 325) ‘[I]n the case of the ants, every little improvement in the workers proceeds from the
variation of a determinant of the germ-plasm that was contained in the germ-cells of the parents.’
qE2. Social: (insects; Weismann, 1893, p. 327) ‘Obviously the workers must be more rapidly improved when all in a hive are the progeny
of one queen – i.e., if they are all alike or almost alike.’
qE3. Social: (insects; Wheeler, 1928b, p. 13) ‘[P]rogeny are not only protected and fed by the mother, but eventually co-operate with her
in rearing additional broods of young, so that parent and offspring live together in an annual or perennial society.’
qE4. Social: (insects; Huxley, 1930, p. 10) ‘Three main grades of social habit may be distinguished. In the lowest there is some sort of a
family life, either the mother or both parents living with and helping the developing young. This may be called the sub-social, or
family, grade. The second is the true social, or colonial, grade, in which the young, when fully grown, stay with their parents and
co-operate with them in building the nest and caring for further broods of young. The highest grade is that of the caste-society, in
which some of the young are transformed into unsexed ‘‘neuters’’, who take off the shoulders of the fertile caste all the duties of the
colony, save only that of reproduction.’
qE5. Social: (insects; Haldane, 1932, p. 120) ‘In the case of social insects there is no limit to the devotion and self-sacrifice which may be
of biological advantage in a neuter. In a beehive the workers and young queens are samples of the same set of genotypes, so any form
of behaviour in the former (however suicidal it may be) which is of advantage to the hive will promote the survival of the latter, and
thus tend to spread through the species. The only bar to such a spread is the possibility that the genes in question may induce unduly
altruistic behaviour in the queens. Genes causing such behaviour would tend to be eliminated.’
qE6. Social: (insects; Sturtevant, 1938, p. 74) ‘In terms of natural selection, a ‘‘favorable’’ character is of course to be taken as meaning a
character that leads to the production of more descendants. The sterile castes of the insects named [termites, ants, and many bees and
wasps] have, therefore, developed a character that is unfavorable by definition. . . . In order that the colony be the unit in terms of
natural selection, and that the existence of the sterile caste offer no difficulties to the advocates of pure selection, it is necessary that
each colony have a single fertile queen and that the sterile individuals all be closely related to the queen (presumably her offspring).’
qE7. Social: (insects; Emerson, 1939, p. 198) ‘We may consider degenerative loss of the sterile castes as a parallel to the loss of many
somatic tissues in the parasitic crustacean, Sacculina.’
qE8. Eusocial: (halictid bees; Batra, 1966a, p. 375) ‘[E]usocial behavior, in which the nest-founding parent survives to cooperate with a
group of her mature daughters, with division of labor’
qE9. Semisocial: (bees; Michener, 1969, p. 304) ‘Division of labor, with both egg layers and workerlike individuals among adult females.
. . . All the females are of the same generation, unlike those in the matrifilial colonies of eusocial forms.’
qE10. Primitively eusocial: (bees; Michener, 1969, p. 305) ‘Among primitively social bees, female castes are externally indistinguishable in
structure except for allometric macrocephaly (often intergrading) of some queens.’
qE11. Highly eusocial: (bees; Michener, 1969, p. 306) ‘The highly or complexly social bees have female castes strikingly different from one
another, not only behaviorally, physiologically, and usually in size, but also in external structure.’
qE12. Eusocial: (ants and other insects; Wilson, 1971, p. 4) ‘The ‘‘truly’’ social insects, or eusocial insects as they are sometimes more
technically labeled, include ants, all termites, and the more highly organized bees and wasps. These insects can be distinguished as a
group by their common possession of three traits: individuals of the same species cooperate in caring for the young; there is a
reproductive division of labor, with more or less sterile individuals working on behalf of fecund individuals; and there is an overlap of
at least two generations in life stages capable of contributing to colony labor, so that offspring assist parents during some period of their
life.’
qE13. Eusocial: (insects; Wilson, 1975, pp. 125 and 299) ‘The very definition of higher sociality (‘‘eusociality’’) in termites, ants, bees, and
wasps entails the existence of sterile castes whose basic functions are to increase the oviposition rate of the queen, ordinarily their
mother, and to rear the queen’s offspring, ordinarily their brothers and sisters. . . . In social insects a caste is any set of individuals of a
particular morphological type, or age group, or both, that performs specialized labor in the colony. It is often more narrowly defined
as any set of individuals that are both morphologically distinct and specialized in behavior.’
qE14. Eusocial: (bees; Batra, 1977, p. 291) ‘The single nest-founding female eusocial bee at first performs all duties; then when the
daughters mature, they remain in their natal nest and serve as workers, and the foundress remains as the egg laying queen (Batra,
1966a). . . . Hypersocial here is coined to refer to the very different social arrangement of honey bees and stingless bees in which the
queen is structurally and behaviourally specialized only for egg laying; she cannot begin a new nest without the help of a swarm of
workers (considered as eusocial by Wilson, 1971; Michener, 1974 and many others, but not by Batra, 1966b . . . who first defined and
used the word[)].’
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qE15. Eusocial: (animals; Wilson, 1985, pp. 309–310) ‘A caste is a set of colony members, smaller than the total colony population, that
specialize on particular tasks for prolonged periods of time. Ordinarily, and perhaps in the social insects invariably, the set is
distinguished by some kind of additional marker – a larger size, some other kind of anatomical feature, a different age, or even some
less apparent physiological trait. . . . The linkage between castes and roles is close, and in the case of the more complex forms of
morphological and behavioral variation, it is sometimes necessary to employ roles to distinguish castes.’
qE16. Eusociality continuum: (animals; Sherman et al., 1995, p. 102) ‘Cooperative breeding and eusociality are not discrete phenomena, but
rather form a continuum of fundamentally similar social systems whose main differences lie in the distribution of lifetime reproductive
success among group members.’
qE17. Eusocial: (animals; Crespi & Yanega, 1995, p. 109) ‘Our criterion for eusociality is the presence of castes, which are groups of
individuals that become irreversibly behaviorally distinct at some point prior to reproductive maturity. Eusocial societies are
characterized by two traits: (i) helping by individuals of the less-reproductive caste, and (ii) either behavioral totipotency of only the
more reproductive caste (facultative eusociality) or totipotency of neither caste (obligate eusociality). We define ‘‘cooperative breeding’’
as alloparental care without castes.’
qE18. Eusocial: (insects; Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry, 1995, p. 268) ‘By definition, all eusocial insects show a division of labour between
reproductive and housekeeping/foraging roles. In many, there is a division of labour between workers as well. The simplest type of
specialization is ‘‘age polyethism’’: workers of different ages perform different tasks.’
qE19. Eusocial: (insects; Batra, 1995, p. 2) ‘Thus, in 1966, I coined ‘‘eusocial’’, meaning ‘‘truly social’’ as a simple, euphonious term to
replace ‘‘primitively social’’. . . . Unfortunately, I did not coin a comparable word for honey bee societies at that time . . . I did believe
(and still do) that eusocial bees (and other eusocial insects such as most ants and some social wasps) actually have a superior type of
queen. . . . ‘‘[E]usocial’’ took on a lively life of its own, creeping into review articles, then into textbooks, where it was used to describe
honey bee societies (as ‘‘highly eusocial’’), which defeated the purpose of its coinage.’
qE20. Eusociality continuum: (animals; Beekman et al., 2006, p. 623) ‘[T]he most important shortcoming of the eusociality continuum is that
a society with a single reproductive individual can result from 2 dramatically different processes: behavioral regulation or
morphological specialization.’
qE21. Facultatively eusocial breeding: (animals; Boomsma, 2013, p. 3) ‘A cooperative breeding system where reproductive and helping roles
are lifelong determined for a substantial fraction of the colony membership, but where a subset of offspring retains reproductive
totipotency in spite of being part of a helper cohort, so they may later inherit the nest as dominant breeder or disperse to become
dominant elsewhere. Caste roles are mostly behavioural and characterized by minor and overlapping distributions of body size and
matedness, but some lifelong subordinates may belong to a physically distinct soldier caste. When a soldier caste is absent, there is no
sharp distinction between advanced cooperative and facultatively eusocial breeding, as both combine obligate colony life with the
retention of reproductive totipotency for some fraction of the subordinates.’
qE22. Obligatorily eusocial breeding: (insects; Boomsma, 2013, p. 3) ‘A breeding system in which all individuals are either designated
breeders or unmated workers/soldiers for life, and where castes are always physically distinct and differentially adapted to a specific
subset of social tasks so that colony growth and reproduction always require the complementary efforts of all castes. This implies that
no caste has retained reproductive totipotency. The evolution of a specialized worker caste of unmated individuals is the ultimate
defining character of obligate eusociality, no matter whether a worker caste evolves after (termites) or before (Hymenoptera) soldiers.’
qE23. Eusocial: (animals; Wilson, 2014, p. 19) ‘Using comparative studies of thousands of animal species, from insects to mammals, we’ve
concluded that the most complex societies have arisen through eusociality – meaning, roughly, the ‘‘true’’ social condition.’
Superorganismality: highlighting variation in precision
qS1. (Super)organismality: (ants, insects; Weismann, 1893, pp. 326–327) ‘[I]n the case of the ant colony, or rather state, the barren
individuals or organs are metamorphosed only by selection of the germ-plasm from which the whole state proceeds. In respect of
selection the whole state behaves as a single animal; the state is selected, not the single individuals; and the various forms behave
exactly like the parts of one individual in the course of ordinary selection.’
qS2. (Super)organismality: (ants, insects; Wheeler, 1902, p. 769) ‘If we look upon the ant-colony as a complex of more or less heterogeneous
individuals, comparable to the Metazoan body, which is also a complex of units, the more or less differentiated cells, we may say that
the sexual individuals of the ant colony develop only under favorable trophic conditions, just as the sexual organs of the Metazoan
mature only under similar conditions.’
qS3. (Super)organismality: (ants, insects; Wheeler, 1910, p. 7) ‘As in the case of the individual animal, no further purpose of the colony can
be detected than that of maintaining itself in the face of a constantly changing environment till it is able to reproduce other colonies of
a like constitution. The queen mother of the ant colony displays the generalized potentialities of all the individuals, just as the
Metazoan egg contains in potentia all the other cells of the body. And, continuing the analogy, we may say that since the different castes
of the ant colony are morphologically specialized for the performance of different functions, they are truly comparable with the
differentiated tissues of the Metazoan body.’
qS4. (Super)organismality: (insects; Wheeler, 1911, p. 310) ‘[P]ermit me to present the evidence for the contention that the animal colony is
a true organism and not merely the analogue of the person.’
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qS5. (Super)organismality: (insects; Huxley, 1912, p. 142) ‘The communities of ants and bees are undoubted individuals. Wheeler in a
recent paper [Wheeler (1911)] has abundantly justified this view from a somewhat different standpoint. Here I can only say that if the
ideas and definitions put forward in Chap. I are accepted, their individuality is beyond dispute. In spite of space, I cannot refrain from
giving one example of the lengths to which internal differentiation of parts can go in such apparently loose-connected wholes. In
several species of ants there are special workers whose duty it is to imbibe honey till their fair round bellies are drum-tight, then to
suspend themselves, a row of living jars, from the roof, and there to wait until their store is needed by the colony and they are taken
down and tapped for general consumption.’
qS6. Superorganismality: (insects; Wheeler, 1928a, pp. 40–41) ‘[M]ulticellular organisms, whose integration is so exceedingly complicated
and opaque that we are probably still centuries removed from any adequate understanding of their functional composition, but on the
next level, that of the very loosely organized social, or superorganisms, in which the actual play of the components is open to inspection
. . . ’
qS7. Superorganismality: (insects; Wheeler, 1928b, p. 23) ‘Another more general problem is suggested by the insect society, or colony as a
whole, which as I have shown in another place (Wheeler, 1911) is so strikingly analogous to the Metazoan body regarded as a colony of
cells, or indeed to any living organism as a whole, that the same very general laws must be involved.’
qS8. (Super)organismality: (insects, humans; Fisher, 1930, p. 181) ‘In this respect the insect society more resembles a single animal body
than a human society, for although many tissues are capable by cell division of the replacement of damaged parts, yet the reproduction
of the whole organism is confined to specialized reproductive tissue, whilst the remainder of the body with its various co-operative
functions, co-operating with but taking no part in reproduction, is in this respect analogous to the body of sterile workers which
constitutes the bulk of the hive.’
qS9. Superorganismality: (insects, humans; Huxley, 1930, pp. 9 and 120–121) ‘Innumerable comparisons have been made between human
society and the social organization of ant, bee, or termite; theories have been advanced and morals pointed, Utopian schemes
encouraged and whole theories of the State built up for man on the basis of analogy with these little insects. Almost without exception
the moral has been false, the analogy misleadingly used. . . . . There is thus no reason to suppose that man is destined to sterilize nurses
or manual workers, to breed armoured or gas-resistant soldiers, communal parents the size of whales, or an intelligentsia all head and
no body.’
qS10. Superorganismality: (termites; Emerson, 1939, pp. 193–194) ‘The colonizing flight of termites is an interesting example of the
superorganismic parallel to the cyclic sexual activity of the organism . . . [A] remarkable sequence of definitive activity is certainly
present which roughly parallels the orientation, movements and fertilization mechanism of the gametes of plants and animals.’
qS11. Superorganismality: (termites; Lu¨scher, 1953, p. 69) ‘If a termite colony is considered as a superorganism, then caste differentiation
may be looked upon as an embryological problem. The differentiation of cells in an embryo is always initiated at a certain critical stage
in their development; in other words, a given group of cells cannot change until it is ready. One may assume that a nymph in a termite
colony similarly can be induced to differentiate only at a critical stage of readiness.’
qS12. Superorganismality: (sensu lato; Wilson, 1967, p. 27) ‘It is doubtful that the term, which is a panchreston of little relevance to the
operational aspects of research, will be employed in the future except in a metaphorical sense.’ This is reference to Hardin (1956, p
112) who dismissed the term protoplasm, writing: ‘At best, the word [which he describes as a ‘‘panchreston’’] has functioned only as
window dressing; at worst, it has probably impeded scientific progress.’
qS13. Superorganismality: (sensu lato; Oster & Wilson, 1978, pp. 21–22) ‘Viewed from the surrounding environment the colony can be
regarded as a superorganism, a large and diffuse ameboid entity whose ingestive apparatus, comprised of the foraging workers, moves
back and forth in circadian pulses over the surrounding territory.’
qS14. Superorganismality: (sensu lato; Wilson & Sober, 1989, pp. 339 and 342) ‘[A]n organism can be defined as ‘‘a form of life composed of
mutually dependent parts that maintain various vital processes’’ (Random House dictionary, unabridged edition). . . . We define a
superorganism as a collection of single creatures that together possess the functional organization implicit in the formal definition of
organism. . . . No differences exist in the fitness of individuals within groups.’
qS15. Superorganismality: (sensu stricto; Seeley, 1989, p. 548) ‘[I]n many species of social insects the female members of a colony (queens and
workers) fight over who will lay eggs. In the most advanced species of social insects, however, there appears to be little if any conflict
within colonies, so that these colonies do represent superorganisms.’
qS16. Superorganismality: (sensu stricto; Wilson & Sober, 1989, pp. 339, 343); ‘We define a superorganism as a collection of single creatures
that together possess the functional organization implicit in the formal definition of organism. . . . When between-unit selection
overwhelms within-unit selection, the unit itself becomes an organism in the formal sense of the word.’
qS17. Superorganismality: (wasps; Queller & Strassmann, 1991, p. 736; consistent with Wheeler, 1911, 1928b) ‘The large, complex,
integrated societies of yellowjackets (as well as ants, honeybees, and termites) are often viewed as superorganisms, with workers
functioning like a metazoan soma, maintaining the integrity of the colony and promoting its reproduction through the germ line
represented by the queen. The superorganism concept does not serve so well for the simpler societies like those of Polistes, where
individuals often seek their own reproductive advantage, sometimes through dangerous fighting. If a Polistes colony is an organism, it is
a very peculiar one, with the various body parts elbowing and kneeing each other aside, each vying to become a gonad.’
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qS18. Superorganismality: (insects; Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992, p. 56, referring to the criteria advocated in qS16) ‘One difficulty with this
definition is the point at which ‘‘overwhelming’’ takes place. For example, is it justifiable to call a honey bee colony a superorganism
(Seeley, 1989), despite the evidence for ‘‘between-unit’’ conflict over queen-rearing? The existence of this conflict might be enough to
withhold use of the term.’
qS19. Superorganismality: (insects; Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992, p. 56) ‘[T]he foraging sub-caste of an insect society is likely to show
‘‘superorganismic’’ properties, even if there is actual conflict in other areas of colony life. Synergism may also occur in other vital tasks,
such as nest defense, construction, and maintenance.’
qS20. Superorganismality: (insects; Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry, 1995, pp. 257–258) ‘The resemblance between the development of an
insect colony and of an organism has led to the concept of a ‘‘superorganism’’. The analogy has some value. To the extent that
individual ants, bees or termites have lost the capacity to reproduce, they can propagate their genes only by ensuring the success of the
colony, just as somatic cells can propagate theirs only by ensuring the success of the organism. Hence, the colony can be expected to
have features adapted to ensure its success, and it is reasonable to apply concepts of optimization to it, rather than to the
individual – as was done, for example, by Oster & Wilson (1978) in their book on insect caste systems. But for our purposes the
concept of a superorganism is of little use. To understand the origins of animal societies, we must ask how individuals capable of
reproduction came to cooperate to the extent that most of them lost the ability to reproduce. To understand their maintenance, we
must explain why they are not disrupted by cheating.’
qS21. Superorganismality: (insects; Wilson & Ho¨lldobler, 2005, p. 13368, consistent with Wheeler, 1911, 1928b) ‘When in evolution does
eusociality become irreversible? We infer that this comes very early in the evolution of that condition, in particular when an
anatomically distinct worker caste first appears, hence when a colony can most meaningfully be called a superorganism.’
qS22. Superorganismality: (sensu lato; Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 2009, pp. 8–9) ‘In the broadest sense, the term superorganism is appropriate for
any insect colony that is eusocial, or ‘‘truly social,’’ and that means combining three traits: first, its adult members are divided into
reproductive castes and partially or wholly nonreproductive workers; second, the adults of two or more generations coexist in the same
nest; and third, nonreproductive or less reproductive workers care for the young.’
qS23. Superorganismality: (sensu stricto; Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 2009, p. 9) ‘For those who prefer a stricter definition, the term superorganism
may be applied only to colonies of an advanced state of eusociality, in which interindividual conflict for reproductive privilege is
diminished and the worker caste is selected to maximize colony efficiency in intercolony competition.’
qS24. Superorganismality: (sensu lato and sensu stricto; Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 2009, pp. 513–514) ‘The level of this gradient at which the
colony can be called a superorganism is subjective; it may be at the origin of eusociality (preferred by E.O. Wilson) or at a higher level,
beyond the ‘‘point of no return’’, in which within-colony competition for reproductive status is greatly reduced or absent (preferred by
B. Ho¨lldobler).’
qS25. Superorganismality: (sensu stricto; Seeley, 2010, p. 25) ‘[S]election for close cooperation produced the thoroughly integrated societies of
cells that we know today, for example, as hummingbirds and human beings. The same sort of selection for extreme cooperation has
also happened with some societies of animals to produce the thoroughly harmonious, smoothly running insect societies that we can call
superorganisms. These include not just colonies of honeybees but also the gigantic colonies of leafcutter ants, driver ants, or
fungus-growing termites.’
Superorganismality: untenable non-social-insect extensions
qN1. Superorganismality: (general; Park, 1941, p. 164) ‘[A] community may be said to have a physiology – the study of many functions
within and of the whole, culminating in a study of what is called the superorganism, recently examined by Emerson (1939).’
qN2. Superorganismality: (general; Hartshorne, 1942, p. 254) ‘Now our question is whether a human group is essentially a democracy, a
colony of organisms (or a pseudo-super-organism), lacking radical unity and therefore a dominant monad, lacking, that is, a
full-fledged group mind that disposes of the members for its own purposes, or whether it is so unified that it can as a whole possess a
single individual mind, metaphysically speaking the aristocrat or super-member of the group.’
qN3. Superorganismality: (general; Wilson, 1990, p. 138) ‘Envisioning group selection as a process analogous to individual selection
therefore makes it quite reasonable that, in certain ecological situations, random associations of individuals can be molded into
functionally organized groups – superorganisms in the same sense that individuals are organisms.’
qN4. Superorganismality: (global; Lovelock, 2000, Preface) ‘The biosphere is the three-dimensional geographic region where living
organisms exist. Gaia is the superorganism composed of all life tightly coupled with the air, the oceans, and the surface rocks.’
qN5. Superorganismality: (general; Camill, 2004, p. 1) ‘Forbes saw the community of interacting species in the lake as a complex machine, a
superorganism, where order is a natural consequence of proper functioning among its parts. Popularity for the superorganism concept
arose, in part, from the search for a unifying conceptual framework for ecology, especially how the interactions among parts of
ecological systems (organisms) might lead to emergent properties at higher levels (populations and communities).’
qN6. Superorganismality: (humans; Li et al., 2008, p. 2117) ‘Human beings can be considered as ‘‘superorganisms’’ as a result of their close
symbiotic associations with the gut microbiota. Superorganism metabolism involves integration of truly indigenous metabolic processes
(coded in the host genome) with those of the microbiome.’
qN7. Superorganismality: (humans; Duarte et al., 2012, p. 636) ‘Extending understanding from other social neurobiological systems, we
argue that considering sports teams as functional integrated ‘‘superorganisms’’ might allow us to capture the self-organized dynamics
of complex social interactions that shape collective behaviours in teams.’
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Wheeler’s (1911) key paper – his first and only in-depth
treatment of the superorganism – was not regularly cited
during the decades that followed. This does not imply that
the article was unread, or that its thesis was rejected, but the
citation data suggest that the superorganism hypothesis was
accepted passively, or even treated as a truism. As previous
authors (e.g. Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 2009) have pointed out,
much of the social insect research conducted in the 1950s
and 1960s focused on the chemical (ants and termites) and
acoustic or tactile (bees) basis of social coordination. This
work transformed our understanding of social insect biology,
but it is difficult to see how the honeybee dance language
(Von Frisch, 1956) or the first identification of substances
such as brood and trail pheromones (Wilson, 1959, 1965)
could have been seen as a challenge to the idea that colonies
are superorganisms (see e.g. Lu¨scher, 1953), and thus have
justified the abandonment of Wheeler-superorganismality in
the second half of the 20th century.
Wheeler himself rarely made use of the superorganism in
the major works he published after 1911, and other research
ignored it almost entirely (e.g. Bailey, 1920; Brian, 1965;
Donisthorpe, 1927 – notwithstanding this leading British
myrmecologist of the time dedicating his book to Wheeler;
Elton, 1932). After an early approving discussion by Huxley
(1912) (Table 2, qS5) only Alfred Emerson set out to elab-
orate directly upon Wheeler’s ideas (Emerson, 1939, 1952).
Some have claimed the problem was not that the notion
of intra-colony integration was controversial (e.g. Lumsden,
1982), but that the superorganism appeared to offer ‘no tech-
niques, measurements, or even definitions by which the intri-
cate phenomena in genetics, behavior, and physiology can be
unraveled’ (Wilson, 1967, p. 31, 1971). However, that seems
a strange criticism, as no biologists abandoned Weismann’s
proposal that metazoans are characterized by germ-line and
soma because it offered no reductionist hypotheses about the
developmental biology of cell lineages. As noted by Folse
& Roughgarden (2010), Weismann (1893) was probably the
first to see the clear parallels between organismal and super-
organismal germ-line and soma (Table 2, qS1). This precise
insight was later lost when, following Wheeler’s death, the
colony-as-superorganism thesis was transformed by others
into a holistic metaphor meant to imply that homeostasis
can be found at all levels of biological organization (Wil-
son, 1967; Cronin, 1991) (e.g. Table 2, qN1 and qN2). As
summarized by Wilson & Sober (1989), the demise of the
superorganism was celebrated as a major achievement by
social insect experts and general evolutionary biologists alike,
but the idea researchers set out to overthrow was a grossly
distorted caricature of the original Wheeler version.
Subsequent efforts to reinstate the superorganism have
clearly been successful, as the superorganism meme is now
well established in the literature, but one cannot claim
that the concept was ‘resurrected’ without specifying to
what extent new versions resemble Wheeler’s (1911) original
(Mitchell, 1995). There is in fact very little similarity because
the original hypothesis was lost in translation during the last
decades of the 20th century and replaced by alternatives that
were either less precise or overly precise, and not generally
agreed upon. It is telling that even The Superorganism, a
monograph that is often credited with completing the revival
of the colony-as-superorganism thesis (Ho¨lldobler & Wilson,
2009), presents the concept in three incompatible forms, all
of which differ from Wheeler’s original version (Table 2,
qS22–24) that the authors had tacitly endorsed a few years
earlier (Wilson & Ho¨lldobler, 2005) (Table 2, qS21). On
a more fundamental level, whereas Wheeler sought to
establish a comparative research program in which social
insects with physically differentiated castes could be used
as models for understanding complementary integration of
cells in multicellular organisms (Table 2, qS6; see also qS10
and qS11), contemporary authors have often used the term
superorganism to emphasize awe-inspiring but idiosyncratic
aspects of social organization (but see Helantera¨, 2016).
(2) The general demise of conceptual transparency
from the 1980s onwards
As we noted already, Wheeler’s emphasis on physical
queen–worker caste differentiation was never shown to be
misplaced, but was simply abandoned to make room for
‘modern’ biological practices that focused primarily on prox-
imate mechanisms of behaviour, genetics and ecology. The
key evidential sources cited in Wilson (1971, p. 318) to justify
the dismissal of the superorganism appear to be critiques of
the teleological and anthropomorphic elements that others
had added to it (Novikoff, 1945), perhaps partly induced by
Wheeler’s later (1928) writing which was less conceptually
stringent than his early (1910, 1911) work (Cronin, 1991).
The unfortunate consequence was that the ultimate questions
about the emergence of nature’s obvious layers of hierar-
chical complexity that had inspired many of the pioneering
evolutionary biologists also disappeared from the centre
stage. They would not re-emerge until the mid-1990s and
by then the scientific landscape had substantially changed.
In 1975, the sociobiology approach had billed itself as ‘the
systematic study of the biological basis of all social behaviour’
(Wilson, 1975, p. 4), often emphasizing loosely defined func-
tional similarities that would easily allow inferences about
humans and other social animals to be drawn (Table 1).
In the same year, inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1963,
1964a,b) obtained its fully general form based on the Price
equation (Hamilton, 1975; Dawkins, 1976; Harman, 2010),
but it took years for this levels-of-selection framework for
understanding social evolution to become integrated with
the sociobiology approach (Keller, 1999), which continued
to embrace ambiguous definitions of eusociality and super-
organismality (e.g. Table 2, qS13). When calls for the return
of the superorganism first emerged in the 1980s (Lumsden,
1982; Seeley, 1989; Wilson & Sober, 1989), and 1990s (See-
ley, 1995), and then subsequently gained momentum in the
early 2000s (Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 2009), they were rooted
in the convenience definitions of sociobiology that were
explicitly at odds with the original concepts of eusociality
(Batra, 1995) and superorganismality (Wheeler, 1911).
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On the very first page of the article in which she defined
eusociality, Batra (1966a) clearly noted that there is a funda-
mental difference between halictid bee eusociality with plastic
helper roles, and the social systems of honeybees and stingless
bees, where all colony members belong to one of two distinct,
physically differentiated castes (Table 2, qE8). Or, as Crespi
& Yanega (1995, p. 109) suggested, ‘The primary reason that
the definition of eusociality takes its present form is that it was
developed for halictine bees in particular and borrowed for
social arthropods in general’. Had Batra’s (1966a) paper not
been devoted exclusively to halictid bees, one would almost
have expected her to have identified the stingless bees and
honeybees as a separate superorganismic domain (Table 2,
qE14 and qE19), perhaps even quoting Wheeler (1911).
With the superorganism having been dismissed as a mis-
nomer of unscientific holism (Wilson, 1967), it is perhaps no
surprise that Michener (1969, 1974) coined the term ‘highly
eusocial’ for species with physically differentiated castes,
rather than employing the term ‘superorganism’ (Table 2,
qE10 and qE11). His classification is functionally reminiscent
of Wheeler-superorganismality, which some other scholars
continued to use correctly until the middle of the 20th
century (Table 2, qS10 and qS11) (later Emerson papers
become much more opaque; Cronin, 1991). However,
whereas Weismann, Huxley, Wheeler and Batra had inferred
that advanced colony life could evolve only subsocially by
offspring staying to help a single (pair of) founding parent(s)
(Table 2, qE1, qE3, qE4 and qE8), Michener argued that
high-level eusociality could also evolve para(semi)socially
(Table 2, qE9), i.e. by aggregation of same-generation colony
founders (Lin & Michener, 1972; West Eberhard, 1975).
An earlier version of that extension had triggered explicit
scepticism by Hamilton (1964b) and Michener (1985) sub-
sequently re-invoked this argument, but in rather technical
terms which largely prevented the message from reaching
researchers lacking specialized knowledge of the biology of
bees. A further historical misfortune is that Michener (1969,
1974) cited the wrong article (Batra, 1966b), which effectively
left the original eusociality concept (Batra, 1966a) orphaned
for non-bee biologists. Moreover, almost no one noticed
Batra’s own attempts to set the record straight when she later
coined the term ‘hypersocial’ for honeybees and stingless
bees to acknowledge the significance of their physically
differentiated and completely mutually co-dependent castes
(Batra, 1977, 1995) (Table 2, qE14 and qE19).
In this light, it is not surprising that eusociality and
superorganismality could only be haphazardly connected
to the major transitions in evolution paradigm that emerged
in the 1990s. Evolutionary biologists with a passing interest
in social insects could do little else than consider eusocial
animals sensu Wilson (1971, 1975, 1985) as a single,
homogenous group. Writing in an era when synthesis
monographs by specialists gave them no reason to believe
otherwise (Table 2, qE12, qE13, qE15 and qS13), Maynard
Smith & Szathma´ry (1995) drew the conclusion that the
origins of eusociality sensu Oster & Wilson (1978) constitute
major evolutionary transitions (Table 2, qE18, qS13, qS20).
By defining the first emergence of insect colonies as major
transitions independent of individual commitment, their
book did a great deal to popularize the claim that essentially
all Wilson-eusocial insects have transitioned beyond the
level of metazoan multicellularity simply because they form
‘societies’. However, by not being specific on the criterion
of physically distinct queen–worker polymorphism, readers
were left with confusion about the colony-as-superorganism
thesis. In retrospect, this may have been a choice between
a rock and a hard place, i.e. between a sociobiological
superorganism concept that had become distorted to the
point of being meaningless and an alternative formulation
based on untenable group-selection logic (Wilson & Sober,
1989) that Maynard Smith would have found principally
unacceptable (Maynard Smith, 1987) (Table 2, qS14). By
their endorsement of catch-all Wilson-eusociality as a broad
putative transition towards some form of higher complexity
(Table 2, qE15 and qS20), Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry
(1995) inadvertently opened a Pandora’s box filled with
difficulties associated with unspecified emergent properties
and appeals to reproductive harmony (Wilson & Sober, 1989)
(Table 2, qS14). At the same time, they also sidestepped
the more coherent but overly restrictive conflict-regulation
version of superorganismality by Seeley (1989) that had
gained considerable traction by 1995 (Table 2, qS15) (see
Sections II.3–5 for further details).
(3) ‘Resurrected’ superorganism hypotheses never
received a solid conceptual foundation
Once the sociobiology definition of eusociality (Wilson,
1971, 1975, 1985) took hold, the notion that morphologically
distinct castes represent a special state of organizational
complexity faded from professional consciousness. Caste
differentiation became based on purported behavioural
differences (Table 2, qE12, qE13 and qE15), lumping
together foraging by morphologically differentiated castes,
reproductive skew contests in dominance hierarchies, and
age-specific behavioural differences (Peeters & Crozier,
1988). This made ‘caste’ applicable to almost any social
organism, and relaxed the need to consider that morphologi-
cal caste differentiation requires complete and evolutionarily
irreversible genetic rewiring of exceedingly complex develop-
mental pathways to create an integrated higher level ‘social
physiology’ (Wheeler, 1986; Johnson & Linksvayer, 2010).
Physically differentiated queen and worker castes are thus
incomparable with other forms of Wilsonian ‘caste’ that are
merely expressions of phenotypic plasticity (West-Eberhard,
1989) which can reverse over both developmental and
ecological time. Although plasticity can create substantial
differences between phenotypes with the same genotype,
there is a point where morphological caste differences need
to acquire distinct hardwired developmental pathways to
diverge further into forms that are fixed for adult life (Wilson
& Ho¨lldobler, 2005; McShea, 2015). The comparative
data unambiguously support that behavioural ‘castes’
always precede true morphological castes over evolutionary
time, and that there have been no reversals (but merely
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occasional lateral reductions; Table 2, qE7) to the ancestral
monomorphic and phenotypically plastic states after the
evolution of physical germ–soma caste differentiation
(Boomsma, 2013).
From the 1980s onward, broad-brush eusociality came to
be regarded as the most advanced type of social organization
found across all animal lineages – a remarkable and even
greater deviation from Batra’s original definition (Table 1).
Smooth-continuum thinking was driven to extremes in the
mid-1990s (e.g. Gadagkar, 1994; Keller & Perrin, 1995;
Sherman et al., 1995) (e.g. Table 2, qE16), in spite of pleas
to exercise restraint when applying the term ‘eusociality’
(Peeters & Crozier, 1988; Kukuk, 1994; Crespi & Yanega,
1995; Beekman, Peeters & O’Riain, 2006) (e.g. Table 2,
qE20). This is all the more puzzling because, upon closer
inspection, two of the three catch-all criteria for the socio-
biology version of eusociality (Wilson, 1971) are ambiguous
in species with physically differentiated queen and worker
castes: (i) generation overlap – helpers can no longer be
considered true generations when they are obligatory sterile
in the presence of their mother queen, which is universally
true in the higher termites (Higashi et al., 1991) and often
a correct approximation in the ants and corbiculate bees
(Hammond & Keller, 2004; Ratnieks & Helantera¨, 2009),
and (ii) cooperative brood care – it becomes a stretch to
continue calling brood care cooperative in the traditional
sense when reproductives are isolated in royal cells (higher
termites) and domesticated for egg production by life-time
unmated workers. The latter is not only typical for higher
termites, ants and perennial corbiculate bees, but also for
short-lived colonies of bumblebees and vespine (yellowjacket)
wasps, where workers manage their domesticated queen
towards the end of the colony life cycle by killing or
abandoning her at the best possible moment for maximizing
their own inclusive fitness (Bourke, 1994; Loope, 2015).
Apparently, when the third criterion for sociobiological
eusociality – reproductive division of labour – has become
manifest as irreversible morphologically distinct caste fate for
all colony members, the two other criteria lose the meaning
they had for cooperative breeders. This is what one would
expect when physical germ–soma caste differentiation
marks an irreversible major evolutionary transition, and thus
aptly illustrates that glossing this over made it very difficult to
see the major transition woods for the broad-brush eusocial
superorganism trees.
Coincident with the emergence of new superorganism con-
cepts in the 1980s, researchers inspired by the seminal work
of Trivers & Hare (1976) began using Hamiltonian inclusive
fitness principles to test systematically for the expression of
reproductive conflicts in social insects (e.g. Herbers, 1984;
Bourke, 1988; Ratnieks, 1988; Boomsma & Grafen, 1990;
Bourke & Franks, 1995; Crozier & Pamilo, 1996). Over time,
a large body of empirical research accumulated, demonstrat-
ing that reproductive conflicts between hymenopteran work-
ers and queens over sex allocation and male production are
ubiquitous. These conflicts often result in one caste enhanc-
ing its inclusive fitness at the expense of the other (Ratnieks,
Foster & Wenseleers, 2006; Meunier, West & Chapuisat,
2008). Less general, but equally significant conflicts over
caste fate were added later (Bourke & Ratnieks, 1999), and
more recently conflicts between stored ejaculates and their
ensuing patrilines (Sundstrom & Boomsma, 2001; Hughes
& Boomsma, 2008; Galbraith et al., 2016) also came to
light. Reproductive allocation conflicts of this kind are found
in both superorganismal and non-superorganismal lineages
sensu Wheeler. For example, relatedness-asymmetry-induced
split sex ratios have been documented in halictid bees by
Mueller (1991), in epiponine wasps by Strassmann, Sullen-
der & Queller (2002) and in Formica ants by Sundstro¨m
(1994) and Sundstrom, Chapuisat & Keller (1996), con-
firming that social insect helpers/workers can successfully
attempt to enhance their own inclusive fitness, and thereby
reduce the fitness of egg layers, at all levels of hierarchi-
cal organization. To give a further example of conflict in
seemingly harmonious superorganisms, if honeybee workers
emerge during the short window of queen replacement, their
prospective indirect fitness from nursing a new queen’s off-
spring will be only half of what it would otherwise have been.
In response, such workers express selfish traits that are not in
the interest of the colony, and they ‘plan’ these phenotypic
switches in the pupal stage (Woyciechowski & Kuszewska,
2012), similar to what may happen to regulate queen number
in epiponine wasps (Strassmann et al., 2002). Reproductive
allocation conflicts are thus omnipresent, both in superor-
ganismal and non-superorganismal hymenopteran colonies.
These repeated confirmations of kin conflicts predicted by
inclusive fitness theory were important advances for under-
standing social cooperation from first principles (Bourke &
Franks, 1995; Crozier & Pamilo, 1996), but they also helped
to establish the notion that reduction or regulation of such
conflicts had to be a necessary condition for becoming super-
organismal, a contention that we will argue is incorrect in
Section III 3.
Once Wheeler-superorganismality had been dismissed
and sociobiological eusociality taken for granted, researchers
could only look for superorganisms at the beginning or
towards the end of the Wilson eusociality continuum. These
approaches gave birth to a new sensu lato superorganism (all
social insect colonies are superorganismal) for those primar-
ily inspired by Oster & Wilson (1978), Wilson (1985) and
Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry (1995), and a new sensu stricto
superorganism (only some of the advanced lineages which
have both physical caste differentiation and evolutionarily
derived conflict management are superorganismal) for those
working on colony physiologies of honeybees or ants (e.g.
Seeley, 1989; Moritz & Southwick, 1992; Bonabeau et al.,
1997) (Table 2, qS24). We have summarized our interpre-
tation of these historical events in Fig. 1, illustrating the
distinct social categories proposed by Wheeler (1911), Batra
(1966a, 1977), and Michener (1969) to the left, the Wilsonian
eusociality continuum concept in the middle, and the three
competing superorganism concepts of the last ca. 40 years
to the right. It is clear that only Wheeler’s superorganism
concept constitutes a fully operational scientific definition,
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Fig. 1. A century (bottom time line) of sociality and superorganismality concepts with commonly used social categories in blue boxes
and their coverage by definitions as grey boxes with coloured frames. Wheeler (1911) pursued a top-down categorization stipulating
that physically differentiated queen and worker castes characterize a superorganismal level of hierarchical complexity beyond
solitary insect organismality (orange arrows and box). Batra (1966a, 1977) and Michener (1969) defined stages of social evolution
bottom-up by contrasting subsocial, semi/parasocial and eusocial colonies without morphologically distinct castes and the highly
(hyper)social lineages represented by the perennial honeybees and stingless bees, but not by the annual bumblebees which remained
(albeit ambiguously) as primitively eusocial bees in spite of their physically distinct queen and worker castes. After initially keeping
all transitional stages between the blue boxes open, Michener (1985) eventually reached the same conclusion as Wheeler (1911)
that the ancestors of highly eusocial/superorganismal lineages were sub/eusocial (offspring staying with their mother) rather than
semi/parasocial (multiple same-generation females engaging in cooperative breeding). Vertical double-headed blue arrows indicate
phylogenetically reversible transitions and the orange single-headed arrow illustrates irreversible major evolutionary transitions to
superorganismality based on all colony members having a single, morphologically differentiated caste phenotype for life. Wilson’s
(1971, 1975) merging of all non-solitary animals into a single eusociality gradient (grey box with red frame) caused the major
transitions based on morphologically differentiated queens and workers to become conceptually hidden (i.e. the grey box with the
red frame interrupts the horizontal orange arrow in a much more fundamental way than Batra’s and Michener’s ambiguity about
bumblebees). This induced a quest for the rediscovery of superorganismality either at the start of the sociobiological eusociality
range or towards the end (red horizontal arrows and boxes), yielding two kinds of new superorganism concepts, a sensu lato one
assuming that all loosely defined eusocial systems (Wilson, 1971, 1975) are superorganismal, and a sensu stricto one assuming that
only large and supposedly harmonious colonies are proper superorganisms (Seeley, 1989; Wilson & Sober, 1989). However, only
the Wheeler version of the superorganism (orange text box) appears to be precise relative to a grey target (circle towards the right)
that can be reconciled with an irreversible major transition because the emergence of 100% commitment to a single physical caste
phenotype for life is known (e.g. Wilson & Ho¨lldobler, 2005) and expected (Boomsma, 2013) to be a point of no return. The new
sensu lato superorganism concept is very imprecise because it targets essentially all social systems (cf . Batra, 1995; Table 2, qE19)
without discriminating between them (e.g. Wilson, 2012, 2014), suggesting that all of these are products of comparable major
evolutionary transitions (Table 2, qS24). The new sensu stricto superorganism concept developed by Seeley (1989) is merely overly
precise relative to the grey target in focusing only on derived superorganismal elaborations while excluding annual superorganisms,
such as bumblebees and vespine wasps with life-time physically differentiated caste fates, that are closer to the putative ancestral
lineages with small full-sibling colonies that originally made the transitions.
because it unambiguously stipulates that all and only social
systems with morphologically differentiated castes qualify.
The straightforward classification by Wheeler corresponds
to what Crespi & Yanega (1995) and Boomsma (2007, 2009,
2013) coined ‘obligate eusociality’ to make explicit that all
individuals in a colony commit for life to a single adult caste
phenotype. These lineages are fundamentally different from
their facultatively eusocial counterparts, where a number
of colony members always retain reproductive totipotency
(Crespi & Yanega, 1995), which is incompatible with being
Wheeler-superorganismal (Fig. 1; Table 2, qE17, qE21 and
qE22).
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(4) The new sensu lato superorganism hides the
transitional points of no return
Many arguments can be lined up to document that the
sensu lato superorganism hypothesis (Oster & Wilson, 1978)
fails to identify irreversible (point of no return) transitions in
hierarchical complexity. This rendition of the superorganism
appears to be mostly based on shallow analogies, e.g. on
notions such as castes being like organs, or nests being
a colony’s analogue of a skeleton (Monceau, Bonnard
& Thiery, 2013) or skin (Ho¨lldobler & Wilson, 2009),
which cannot be used without specifying that these criteria
would fail in colonies where caste remains plastic or
nests ephemeral. As outlined by Ratnieks & Reeve (1992),
there is no unambiguous answer to the question of how
many organism-like traits a colony must possess to be a
superorganism (Table 2, qS18) and there are many lineages
that qualify as eusocial sensu Wilson for which there is no
analogy at all with Wheeler superorganismal colonies (see
e.g. Queller & Strassmann, 1991) (Table 2, qS17). It is in
fact surprising that social adaptations became characterized
in such a loose narrative manner less than 10 years after
Williams (1966) had lined up very stringent parsimony
arguments for the functional interpretation of putative
higher-level adaptations (Boomsma, 2016). Two decades
earlier, Schneirla (1946, p. 391) had also correctly noted that
instead of ‘relying upon a method of analogy in studying
social levels, stressing apparent but unclear similarities, it
is preferable to compare phenomena by looking for the
basis of both similarities and differences and endeavoring to
emphasize these according to their respective importances’.
It is crucial to note that polistine wasps and naked mole
rats have caste phenotypes that are principally temporal,
while reproductive privileges are doled out by physical
necessity in ants, honeybees, and vespine wasps, as well
as other lineages where all colony members have a distinct
caste phenotype for life. Morphologically distinct queen
and worker castes have higher-level germ-line and soma
functions, while polistine dominance hierarchies remain
similar to cooperatively breeding vertebrates (Crespi &
Yanega, 1995; Boomsma, 2007, 2013), where high-ranking
egg layers induce ovary regression in lower ranking females,
but without causing the permanent loss of reproductive
totipotency (e.g. Jeanne, 1980). Dormant ovary function thus
remains reversible, and removal of the dominant breeder
reshuffles the hierarchy of inseminated breeders (Strassmann
et al., 2002). Not so in systems where workers are life-time
unmated and queen pheromones are honest signals of fertility
(Keller & Nonacs, 1993; Holman et al., 2010). Distinctions
of this kind are also decisive for understanding sequestered
multicellular germ lines, which are uniquely unitary in all
but the most basal metazoans (Barfield, Aglyamova & Matz,
2016), but recurrent in modular vascular plants, macroscopic
algae, and multicellular fungi (Buss, 1987; Clarke, 2011; Lang
& Rensing, 2015). Not making a similar distinction within
the sociobiologically defined eusocial insects is equivalent to
thinking that post-menopausal human females can regain
fertility by turning ovarian fat cells into eggs. Unique colony
germ lines, as provided by the inseminated founding queens
of ants, bumblebees and vespine wasps, and the founding
pairs of termites, are protected against external danger by
colony workers as soon as these emerge, a service that
became continuous in the evolutionarily derived swarming
honeybees, stingless bees and Provespa wasps (Boomsma,
Husza´r & Pedersen, 2014). Such somatic worker functions
are not found in Polistes colonies, where workers often
challenge reproductive dominants, forcing them to defend
their monopoly (Table 2, qS17) – if their egg layers were to
be germ lines they would be analogous to human eggs risking
death to aid in immune defence against sexually transmitted
disease. This argument extends into the swarm-founding
epiponine wasps where the share of swarming inseminated
breeders in a colony’s later reproductive success is
unpredictable (Strassmann et al., 2002).
In sum, the animal lineages that display the three defining
characteristics of Wilson-eusociality (cooperative brood care,
reproductive division of labour, generation overlap) are so
heterogeneous in their degrees of cooperative breeding and
reproductive altruism that common-cause superorganismal
traits indicative of major evolutionary transitions cannot
be identified across lineages. As long as all, most, or
some individuals have retained the totipotent capacity to
mate and raise offspring of both sexes, they will do so
whenever an opportunity arises. This is fundamentally
different from superorganismal systems sensu Wheeler, where
nursing colony members never mate and breeders always
mate but never re-mate later in life (Boomsma, 2007,
2009, 2013). The sensu lato superorganism concept (Wilson,
1971, 1975, 1985; Oster & Wilson, 1978) must therefore
be incorrect. At best some of the lineages identified by
this concept have evolved a level of organization distinctly
beyond metazoan multicellularity.
(5) The new sensu stricto superorganism misplaces
the transitional points of no return
The sensu stricto hypothesis was proposed by Wilson &
Sober (1989) and Seeley (1989), but in very different ways.
Wilson & Sober (1989) thought that group selection always
had the potential to produce perfectly harmonious group
adaptations (see also Wilson, 1990; Table 2, qS14, qS16,
qN3), a contention that is incompatible with a recent model
specifically designed to capture the superorganism from
first principles (Gardner & Grafen, 2009), and a wealth of
accumulated empirical evidence (see Bourke, 2011a, b for
recent reviews). Seeley (1989) acknowledged reproductive
conflicts, but assumed that harmonious superorganisms like
the honeybee arose by regulating these conflicts (Table 2,
qS15, qS25). The problem with both of these approaches is
that reproductive harmony is not a discrete colony-level trait
that is either present or absent, but a complex set of variables
determined by interactions between queens and nursing
workers who consistently act in their own best inclusive fitness
interest (Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992) (Table 2, qS18 and qS19).
Closer scrutiny also reveals that the notion of ‘cooperative
harmony’ is incompatible with honeybee drones often
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being ‘slaughtered by their industrious and sterile sisters’, a
behaviour that was documented over 150 years ago (Darwin,
1859, pp. 202–203; see also Kirby & Spence, 1818). As
Cronin (1991, p. 308) emphasized more recently, honeybee
social life can be described rather unsympathetically as
mother queens killing offspring queens, older sister queens
killing hatching younger siblings, and workers killing their
brothers. It is this alternative picture which appears to be
supported both by inclusive fitness theory and empirical
studies (Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992; Ratnieks & Helantera¨,
2009). This does not imply that lineages like honeybees
with advanced colony-level adaptations such as collective
thermoregulation or dance language are not superorganismal
(Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992) (Table 2, qS25). The issue is that
neither the presence of potential conflict at the origin of a
major transition, nor the magnitude of expression of actual
conflict in later superorganismal elaborations can be used to
decide whether a lineage is superorganismal or not (Table 2,
qS18 and qS19) (see Section III.3).
The only viable criterion for understanding superor-
ganismal origins as evolutionarily irreversible transitions is
Wheeler’s dichotomous character of morphologically differ-
entiated caste fates for all colony members (Fig. 1). Less
spectacular basal branches or sister lineages of evolutionar-
ily derived superorganisms such as honeybees, army ants,
leaf-cutting ants and Macrotermes fungus-growing termites
must therefore also have transitioned beyond metazoan
organismality when their morphological caste traits unam-
biguously indicate life-time unmatedness for all workers.
Sensu stricto superorganismality thus remains blind for super-
organismal origins (Bourke, 2011a; Clarke, 2014), and fails
to acknowledge that potential reproductive conflict (Ratnieks
& Reeve, 1992) is fundamentally innate to superorganisms
(Table 2, qS18 and qS19), just like nuclear–cytoplasmic con-
flict is to multicellular plants and animals. Buss (1987) gives
examples of conflicts between germ line and soma in basal
metazoan branches where somatic cells retain the capacity to
produce gametes. However, closed germ lines and complex
organismality appear to be universally present in the Bilate-
ria, and likely arose already in the Cnidaria (Barfield et al.,
2016), suggesting by analogy that hymenopteran superor-
ganismal origins required effective queen-policing of worker
egg laying. Until the terminal phase of colony decline, this
seems a reasonable inference because colonies must have
been small and annual at the origins of superorganismality
(e.g. Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992; Zanette et al., 2012).
For the same reason, superorganismal elaborations
with substantial non-suppressed conflict cannot be taken
as evidence for superorganismality being compromised.
What matters is that these conflicts did not affect
the loss of matedness totipotency in both queens and
workers – the hallmark trait of an irreversible transition
to superorganismality. Thus, queen- or male-culling traits
do not make stingless bees, honeybees, or Argentine ants
non-superorganismal (Keller, Passera & Suzzoni, 1989;
Cronin, 1991; Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004; Wenseleers
et al., 2005), just like occasional plant species that suffer
from cytoplasmatic male sterility do not lose their obligatory
multicellular status (Couvet, Ronce & Gliddon, 1998). In
the same vein, conflicts due to meiotic drive or genomic
imprinting (Burt & Trivers, 2006; Galbraith et al., 2016) have
no bearing on the extent to which a lineage is organismal or
superorganismal.
Unlike the untenable sensu lato version of the
superorganism, the sensu stricto superorganism is merely
incomplete in its coverage. The targets towards the right in
Fig. 1 summarize the precision arguments for this contention.
They illustrate that the sensu lato superorganism targets too
many social systems and the sensu stricto superorganism too
few because it excludes superorganisms that have remained
closer to the transitional origin of a lineage-specific point of
no return, such as the bumblebees and vespine wasps.
(6) Back to the origins of superorganismality,
(un)matedness and Hamilton’s rule
Using the terminology of Crespi & Yanega (1995) (Table 2,
qE17), Boomsma (2007, 2009) (Table 2, qE21 and qE22)
postulated that strict ancestral monogamy is a necessary
general condition for making transitions from facultative
eusociality to obligate eusociality sensu Crespi & Yanega
(1995), and that only some social insects – the ants,
crown-group corbiculate bees, vespine wasps, and higher
termites – have independently and irreversibly entered the
hard-wired caste domain beyond metazoan multicellularity
(Fig. 1; Table 2, qE15 and qE16 versus qE17, qE21 and
qE22). Comparative analyses have confirmed life-time
ancestral monogamy in the social Hymenoptera (Hughes
et al., 2008), and the same pivotal turning point was shown
to apply to the transition between lower and higher termites
(reviewed in Boomsma, 2013). However, these reviews left
the connection with superorganismality open-ended, and
Boomsma (2013, p. 2) erroneously credited Batra (1966a)
for defining eusociality as being based on morphological
caste differentiation. After our present historical analysis of
eusociality and superorganismality, the conclusion must be
that hypersociality sensu Batra (1977) and obligate eusociality
sensu Crespi & Yanega (1995) and Boomsma (2007, 2009,
2013) are functionally identical to superorganismality sensu
Wheeler (1911), defined by permanent membership of each
colony member to a single morphologically distinct adult
caste that is fixed for life during early individual development
(Wheeler, 1986; Helantera¨, 2016) (Fig. 1; Table 2, qE4,
qE17, qE21, qE22, qS3, qS6 and qS7).
The key methodological mantra of the sociobiology
approach is that we should use ‘the same parameters and
quantitative theory . . . to analyse both termite colonies and
troops of rhesus macaques’ (Wilson, 1975, p. 4), but such
an approach becomes misleading when crucial caste-type
distinctions that were broadly acknowledged throughout the
history of evolutionary biology (Weismann, 1893; Wheeler,
1911, 1923; Huxley, 1912, 1930; Fisher, 1930; Williams,
1966) are glossed over. One of the more unfortunate
consequences of the broad-brush eusociality concept is the
fact that it removed the essential Batra-meaning of the term
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Fig. 2. The superorganismal social insects and a representative selection of non-superorganismal social insects and (in)vertebrate
cooperative breeders, separated by the evolutionarily convergent point of no return barrier (orange bar) representing the
morphologically differentiated queen–worker caste transitions in the social Hymenoptera and the termites. The three key criteria
of caste phenotype, caste (un)matedness, and breeder dominance/domestication are given in the upper section of the diagram and
animal lineages are ranked from left to right in the middle section using approximate weighted averages of reproductive skew and
social coherence/longevity of colonies across the cooperative breeding–eusociality range (left of the orange bar) and of the degree
of distinct morphological caste differentiation and superorganismal ‘germ-line’ longevity (right of the orange bar). Superorganismal
entries are broadly representative of most recent ancestral states, and do not take into account that secondary reductions may
sometimes have lost or modified castes, because none of these ever represent reversals to an ancestral state of matedness totipotency,
which is universally present in either some or many colony members at the other side of the orange bar (Boomsma, 2013). At the
bottom left we have listed polyembryonic wasps (Giron et al., 2004) and trematodes (Hechinger, Wood & Kuris, 2011) with altruistic
soldier castes that have been called ‘eusocial’, but are not fully comparable with the animals in the middle section because they live
within compartmentalized hosts rather than in their own nests or burrows; their parasitism has also induced complexity reductions
analogous to those in parasitic myxozoan Cnidaria which are reduced multicellular eukaryotes (Chang et al., 2015), not reversals
to protist unicellular life (cf . Table 2, qE7). At the bottom right, we have listed the ambrosia beetle Austroplatypus incompertus, whose
status as an incipient superorganism remains to be confirmed. We did not include marine hydrozoans such as Physalia (Portugese
man o’ war) and Nonomia cnidarians (Bourke, 2011a) because they have modular growth, and thus no early sequestered single germ
line, and they lack the mesoderm that would normally produce most animal organs (Collins et al., 2006).
(cf . Batra, 1995; Table 2, qE14 and qE19), and subsequently
synonymized eusociality with a sensu-lato superorganismality
concept that is grossly imprecise (Fig. 1). Confusion of this
kind goes a long way in explaining why Maynard Smith
and Szathma´ry (1995) (Table 2, qS20) were so dismissive
of the concept of superorganismality. The generalized
Wilsonian concepts of eusociality and superorganismality
that were prominent in the literature towards the turn of the
century prevented them from seeing the obvious point of no
return major transitions marked in orange in Fig. 1. They
unsuccessfully tried to resolve the issue by suggesting that
organisms are able to follow the red (sensu lato) pathway to
superorganismality displayed at the bottom of Fig. 1, even
though the emergence of facultative reproductive altruism in
chimeric groups (Table 2, qS20) has no obvious connection
with their major transitions framework. Issues of this type
demonstrate that terminological adjustments based on the
original meaning of eusociality and superorganismality are
not merely a matter of semantics. Rather, the systematic
classification of the stages of social evolution developed
by early naturalists (Table S2, qS1, qS8, qS10 and qS11)
facilitates straightforward understanding of the generality
of the ‘gene’s eye’ Hamiltonian perspective that nature has
never produced any form of lasting cooperation that does not
have inbuilt potential for conflict (Hamilton, 1996). It is only
after the catch-all sociobiology concept of eusociality became
entrenched that researchers lost sight of the fact that lineages
with phenotypically plastic behavioural castes and those
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with morphologically differentiated castes represent mutually
exclusive hierarchical domains of social evolution (Fig. 1),
separated by irreversible major transitions. In other words,
once a lineage has become Wheeler-superorganismal it is no
longer Batra-eusocial, although it has that ancestry (Fig. 1).
Figure 2 illustrates how the social evolution landscape can be
mapped to do justice to having either full morphological caste
differentiation, some morphological caste differentiation (e.g.
specialized soldiers before true workers evolve, as in the lower
termites), or no morphological caste differentiation.
Universal life-time unmatedness of helper castes unites
the haplodiploid superorganismal ants, corbiculate bees
and vespine wasps with the diploid superorganismal
higher termites, underlining that the exclusive presence of
unmated workers as altruistic helpers of specialized parental
reproductives is the key higher-level adaptation that defines
the origins of all fraternal transitions to superorganismality
(Fig. 2). The logic is that life-time monogamous commitment
between parents breeds life-time commitment to unmated
soma roles in offspring, because outbred monogamy secures
exact equality in gene-copy currency of reproductive success
via offspring (ro) and average siblings (rs) (Boomsma,
2007, 2009). This ‘bioeconomic’ insight was implicitly
acknowledged both by Williams & Williams (1957) and
Hamilton (1964b) (see also Marshall, 2015), but needs to
be made explicit by recognizing that immediately preceding
and often continuing after irreversible transitions, Hamilton’s
rule (brs > cro) reduces to b/c > 1. Note, however, that
achieving a major transition is not assured with strict
relatedness equivalence, as the initially small benefit of
raising siblings (b) relative to the costs of foregoing offspring
(c) needed to be maintained without interruption for a huge
number of generations to achieve irreversible rewiring of
caste-specific developmental pathways for obligate somatic
functions (Boomsma, 2009, 2013). In the Hymenoptera,
and particularly in the ants, secondary elaborations of
superorganismality have included the loss of some, but not
all castes (Table 2, qE7), multiple queen mating (polyandry),
and re-adoption of newly mated daughter queens back into
the nest (polygyny). This underlines that many forms of
Wheeler-superorganismality could arise later from a strictly
monogamous ancestry and remain evolutionarily stable as
long as at least some relatedness was maintained (Boomsma,
2013; Boomsma et al., 2014).
In sum, and slightly modifying Crespi & Yanega (1995),
major transitions to superorganismality appear to have three
predictable steps: (i) the sequestration of nest-founding ‘germ’
individuals as specialized breeders, (ii) the allocation of some
offspring to somatic functions that imply irreversibly reduced
fecundity (e.g. lower termite soldiers; Korb & Heinze, 2016;
Korb & Roux, 2012), and (iii) the completion of binary
mated/unmated caste differentiation for life among all colony
members, marking the evolutionary point of no return
where superorganismal coevolution for complementarity
between now-permanent caste phenotypes, none of them
totipotent any longer, can begin. Only the final step
cements reproductive division of labour as an unambiguous
higher-level (full sibling family) adaptation, consistent with
how Weismann (1893), Huxley (1930) and Fisher (1930)
and later researchers such as Williams & Williams (1957)
explained the evolutionary origins of social insect colonies
with morphologically distinct castes (Table 2, qE1, qE2, qE4,
qS1 and qS8) (see also Owen, 2014).
III. RESOLVING THE TERMINOLOGICAL
QUAGMIRE FACILITATES EVOLUTIONARY
UNDERSTANDING
(1) Comparing unmated superorganismal castes
with sterile organismal soma
As the Page & Mitchell (1993) epigraph at the start of
this review indicates, coherence of concepts across the
realms of organisms and superorganisms is necessary to
understand the stepwise, ratchet-like increases in cellular
and colonial complexity from first principles. Life-time
monogamy (Boomsma, 2007, 2009) as a necessary condition
for any evolutionary origin of eusocial superorganismality
(Hughes et al., 2008; Boomsma, 2013) and asexual or single
zygote clonality as a necessary condition for any origin
of somatic multicellular organismality (Fisher et al., 2013)
achieve that coherence (Fig. 3). The fact that parallel
processes act across these different domains of social
evolution makes sense because a syngamous zygote is
an equally strong foundational bond as life-time parental
monogamy (e.g. Boomsma, 2007, 2009; Ghiselin, 2011).
The life-time commitment principle is consistent with 100%
single zygote bottlenecking (Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry,
1995) and apparently overrules potential conflicts between
co-replicons that may be expressed later in development.
For example, plants and animals derived from a single
zygote have a nuclear and a cytoplasmatic co-replicon whose
diverging reproductive allocation interests are normally
resolved in favour of the nuclear genes (Cosmides & Tooby,
1981), although cytoplasmatic genes in plants occasionally
suppress anther formation in flowers, triggering the nuclear
genome to evolve compensating modifiers (Leigh, 1977).
However, this type of conflict is never relevant before
organisms reach sexual maturity, and thus has no bearing
on the origins of life-time commitment of two gametes to a
single zygote (see Section III.3 for further details).
Moving from diploid plant and animal organisms to
diplo-diploid termite superorganisms, the only functional
difference is that termite colonies have a tetraploid germ
line consisting of the life-time monogamous founding pair
(Boomsma, 2009, 2013). However, the default practice of
colony founding in haplo-diploid social insects is a triploid
analogy (a singly inseminated queen) (Boomsma, 2009),
which creates as much inbuilt fraternal conflict as between
the egalitarian nuclear and cytoplasmatic genes packaged in
a plant or animal zygote. This is because hymenopteran
stored sperm only passes on genes to daughters and
cytoplasmatic genes have a similarly exclusive interest in
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Fig. 3. Parallel major transitions from eusociality to
superorganismality in insects and from little differentiated clonal
multicellularity to complex organismality in eukaryotes (orange
arrows). As shown in Fig. 1 (represented by the right-hand panel
here), the semi(para)-social route has allowed obligate breeding
in colonies to evolve, but only subsocial and Batra-eusocial
ancestors with full-sibling helpers (Table 2, qE8) produced
superorganismal lineages sensu Wheeler that are universally
characterized by physically differentiated queen and worker
castes, as in the ants, crown group corbiculate bees, vespine
wasps and higher termites (Boomsma, 2007, 2013; Hughes
et al., 2008). Likewise (left-hand panel), chimeric aggregation of
same-generation cells has only produced simple and temporary
forms of multicellularity that normally characterize parts of life
cycles or populations, whereas single cell (clonal or zygote)
foundation was a necessary condition for the evolution of
obligate multicellular organismality (Fisher et al., 2013). As
in Fig. 1, double-headed blue arrows indicate transitions
that remain reversible. The single-headed orange arrows
indicate irreversible transitions, which remain hidden when
conceptualizing multicellularity and eusociality as smooth
gradients (grey boxes with red frames; see Section III.2).
female reproductive processes. While mitochondrial genes
normally remain powerless to increase the proportion
of female gametes or offspring, the hymenopteran social
insects have an unmated worker caste that does all the
brood nursing, and is thus more likely to succeed in
pursuing female-biased sex allocation (Trivers & Hare, 1976;
Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; Boomsma & Grafen, 1991;
Beekman & Ratnieks, 2003). The hymenopteran social
insects therefore carry an intrinsic potential conflict load
that is absent in the termites (Gardner, Alpedrinha & West,
2012; Alpedrinha, West & Gardner, 2013). However, the
fact that Wheeler-superorganismality could evolve in both
diploids and haplodiploids demonstrates that these inbuilt
conflicts are not decisive for the origins of major evolutionary
transitions.
When 100% full-sib colonies are a necessary con-
dition for making transitions from Batra-eusociality to
Wheeler-superorganismality, and 100% clonal bodies a
necessary condition for making transitions from simple
facultative multicellularity to complex somatic organismality
(Fig. 3), the implications are that: (i) aggregative (parasocial)
group formation has apparently never produced lineages
with universally unmated and morphologically differentiated
nursing castes (Fig. 1) (Hughes et al., 2008), and (ii) non-clonal
cell aggregations have never produced anything more than
very simple cell differentiation when becoming multicellular
(Bonner, 1988; Fisher et al., 2013). This logic is not only con-
sistent with Hamilton’s rule as outlined in Section II.6, but
also with the model by Gardner & Grafen (2009) which con-
cluded that sensu stricto superorganismality could never evolve
from aggregative processes unless clonality arose as a deus ex
machina along the way, or some other, presently unimaginable
process created zero reproductive conflict. Such character-
istics clearly do not apply to lineages that evolved complex
organismality or superorganismality (Hughes et al., 2008;
Fisher et al., 2013). On closer inspection, these insights also
appear to be consistent with a model by Reeve & Ho¨lldobler
(2007), where dynamic changes in within-group cooperation
and between-group competition were analysed with related-
ness within and across groups, group size, and group density
as predictor variables. This showed correlated responses for
more or less cooperation but without making cooperation go
to fixation, i.e. without creating the necessary conditions for
the evolution of irreversible group adaptation and obligate
physical caste differentiation. In retrospect, it is sobering to
realize that Weismann (1893) and Wheeler (1910) captured
the essence of exclusive colony-founding bottlenecking via
queen–male zygote analogues more than a century ago
(Table 2, qE1 and qS3), and regrettable that this key insight
was subsequently neglected for over half a century.
Table 3 captures the parallels between the evolutionary
developments towards superorganismality and multicellular
organismality in simple verbal terms, emphasizing the
sequential steps towards, and commitment consequences
of, irreversible major transitions rather than the changes
in key social traits during the origins of new hierarchical
levels as shown in Fig. 2. Table 3 is constructed around
Bourke’s (2011a) insight that social group formation,
social group maintenance/elaboration, and social group
transformation/transition need to be considered separately
(see also Clarke, 2014; West et al., 2015). We use this sequence
to evaluate relationships between facultative (plastic) or
obligate (morphologically distinct) caste/soma phenotypes
(Crespi & Yanega, 1995; Fisher et al., 2013) and the
presence/absence of strict life-time founding commitments
between two parents or two gametes (Boomsma, 2007). The
evidence suggests that there are always two similar precursor
states towards a third irreversible major transition state,
and supports the conclusion that germ-line sequestration
and initiation of unmatedness that we identified at the
end of Section II.6 are the final elements of the second
step. Only the point of no return completion of these
developments, (corresponding to the orange arrows in Fig. 3),
appears to depend crucially on precise and lasting relatedness
equivalence between offspring and siblings. Systems where
this final necessary condition is not 100% fulfilled retain
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Table 3. Capturing the transitional routes from solitary breeding to superorganismality and from unicellular eukaryote life to
complex multicellular organismality using the scheme by Bourke (2011a), which stipulates that major transitions have three phases
of which we postulate that the last one needs to be irreversible: (i) social group formation, (ii), social group maintenance/elaboration,
and (iii) social group transformation/transition. Here we combine this sequence with ro/rs relatedness-equivalence as a necessary
condition for making relatedness terms cancel out of Hamilton’s rule, so that major fraternal transitions in hierarchical complexity
become possible, but do not necessarily (in fact only very rarely) follow (Boomsma, 2007, 2009). Columns towards the right list key
social variables: the necessity or not to breed in colonies or somatic bodies (colony or multicellular life), the necessity or not for the
last reproductively totipotent individuals or cells to commit to a life-time nursing caste or soma phenotype (individual commitment),
and the ensuing presence/absence of developmental plasticity (phenotypic plasticity for caste/germ line/soma). Step 2 elaborations
preceding the irreversible step 3 transitions may include the sequestration of ‘germ’ individuals or cell lineages and the altruistic
specialization of some or even most offspring or cells for somatic functions with reduced fecundity. However, it is the completion
of matedness or gametogenesis differentiation for all colony members or cell lineages that defines the points of no return where
(super)organismal coevolution between now-permanent caste phenotypes or germ/soma cell lineages can begin. Only this final
step 3 has life-time commitment of two founding parents (for social insect colonies) or two gametes (for sexual eukaryotes) as a
universal necessary condition. Symbol legend: ro, relatedness or gene-level reproductive success via offspring; rs, average relatedness
or gene-level reproductive success via siblings
The route towards superorganismality Colony life Individual caste commitment
Phenotypic plasticity
for caste
(1) Breeders may or may not have helpers
↓ Cooperative breeding origins
Facultative Facultative Present
(2) Breeding only possible in nests with helpers
↓ Eusocial elaborations
Obligate Facultative or partly obligate High
(3) All workers remain unmated for life
Major transitions to superorganismality possible when
rs = ro = 0.5
Obligate Obligate Absent
The route towards complex organismality Multicellularity Individual cell commitment
Phenotypic plasticity
for germ-line/soma
(1) Unicellular protists may or may not have somatic cells
↓ Aggregations of multicellular protists
Facultative Facultative Present
(2) Only multicellular bodies with soma can reproduce
↓ Multicellular elaborations
Obligate Facultative or partly obligate High
(3) No somatic cells can enter germ lines any longer
Major transitions to complex metazoan organismality possible
when rs = ro = 1.0
Obligate Obligate Absent
at least some of their phenotypically plastic (behavioural)
helper phenotypes, or relatively undifferentiated somatic cell
phenotypes. Only 100% relatedness equivalence removes
any form of preference for direct or indirect fitness benefits
in families of cells or siblings, underlining the fact that major
transitions to organismality and superorganismality are
convergent phenomena. It is only at these major transitional
points that reproductive altruism by cell copies or offspring
becomes mostly unconditional through the irreversible loss
of reproductive totipotency in gametogenesis and matedness.
After such major fraternal transitions are completed,
occasional selfish traits are expressed only by some individuals
(e.g. Woyciechowski & Kuszewska, 2012) or cell lineages (e.g.
Buss, 1987), and usually under a narrow range of conditions.
(2) Identifying major transitions with continuous
gradient concepts is difficult
Before we proceed to evaluate some of the wider implications
of our analyses, it is appropriate to mention alternative
approaches that have been used to characterize transitions
to (super)organismality and their correlates. First, Michod
(2000), Folse & Roughgarden (2010) and Bourke (2011a)
have followed Buss (1987) and Huxley (1912) in using the
term ‘individuality’ instead of ‘organismality’. While this
terminology can be useful, the idea that a social group of cells
or animals can be considered more or less of an individual
appears to be connected to the assumption that major
transitions can happen via aggregative (parasocial) pathways
of ‘coming together’. This overtly anthropomorphic view
goes back to Henry Ford’s well-known remark that ‘coming
together is a beginning, keeping together is progress, working
together is success’. This sequence captures some of the
variation in social cohesion across facultative multicellular
lineages or along cooperative breeding and facultative
eusociality gradients (left of the orange bar in Fig. 2), but
fails to recognize that the dichotomous point of no return
that defines any subsequent major transition could only
happen via the subsocial route, where maximal relatedness
is a necessary condition for ‘keeping together’ and where
‘coming together’ is represented only by parental life-time
commitment (Fig. 3). In contrast to terminology based
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on (super)organismality, individuality language does not
naturally invite asking what the necessary and sufficient
conditions for major transitions are, and neither does it
allow the insight that ratchet-like major transitions represent
the only unambiguous examples of matter-of-fact progress
in evolution. Using the top-down (core family based)
life-time commitment principle for explaining the origins
of major fraternal transitions thus clarifies the underlying
evolutionary processes that are missed when using a
levels-of-selection perspective based on bottom-up coming
together of same-generation units (Pepper & Herron, 2008;
Clarke, 2011, 2014; Okasha, Weymark & Bossert, 2014;
Okasha, 2015). As our analyses indicate, bottom-up coming
together completely lacks the prospect of ever realizing a
major fraternal evolutionary transition.
Second, intra-colony conflict levels tend to decrease
with colony size (Bourke, 1999), both when colonies have
behavioural castes and when they have morphological castes,
but the type and impact of conflict between lineages with and
without morphological caste differentiation is fundamentally
different. Pre-superorganismal conflict reduction (top-left
section of Fig. 2; step 2 in Table 3) is primarily about
direct fitness and reproductive skew between individuals
whose mating totipotency is intact (e.g. Strassmann et al.,
2002; Nonacs & Hager, 2011), whereas conflict reduction
in superorganisms (top-right section of Fig. 2, i.e. after
the irreversible step 3 in Table 3 has been completed) is
mainly about allocating resources to reproductive brood
with maximal indirect fitness returns to make the best of
permanent worker-caste fate. Irreversible loss of reproductive
totipotency is therefore itself a key conflict-resolving
mechanism. The main reason for superorganismal colonies
reaching larger size (Bourke, 1999) thus appears to be that
life-time unmatedness of workers avoids reproductive skew
conflicts, altogether in higher termites, and (usually) as long
as the queen is alive and fertile in the haplodiploid social
Hymenoptera. When superorganisms became perennial
from short-lived ancestral states comparable to extant
bumblebees and vespine wasps (Fig. 2), policing and coercion
were typically further elaborated as conflict-regulating
mechanisms, but mostly as secondary elaborations in
response to lower offspring relatedness when colonies started
to adopt or replace queens, or queens evolved multiple
mating (Hammond & Keller, 2004; Ratnieks et al., 2006;
Ratnieks & Helantera¨, 2009; Woyciechowski & Kuszewska,
2012; Boomsma et al., 2014) (but see Zanette et al., 2012). This
implies that colony size is unlikely to be a universal driver
of social evolution, but an important correlate with different
causes and consequences on either side of the orange bar in
Fig. 2. Because of these differences, median colony size in
Wheeler-superorganisms (right side of Fig. 2) is much larger
than in cooperative breeders and eusocial lineages without
life-time castes (left side of Fig. 2), but the ranges overlap as
some superorganismal colonies have remained or become
very small and swarm-founding paper wasp colonies can be
very large. Such overlap is all but absent in comparisons
between aggregative facultative multicellularity with minor
differentiation in cell types and zygote-founded organismality
with complex soma (Bonner, 1988), e.g. slime mould slugs
versus the smallest bilaterian metazoans, to say nothing of
elephants or whales.
Third, Queller & Strassmann (2009) and Strassmann &
Queller (2010) have used organismality terminology, but
retained a sociobiological continuum approach in their
analyses of cooperation and conflict gradients, which we
believe is unsatisfactory because it continues to lump
(cf . Wilson, 1975; Sherman et al., 1995) distinct domains
of complexity that are separated by major evolutionary
transitions. Not acknowledging the fundamental importance
of permanent castes and permanent soma means one cannot
be explicit either about the causes of secondary elaborations
on either side of such transitions being distinct. For example,
differences in social organization between colonies of Polistes
and Polybia wasps (Jeanne, 1991; Strassmann et al., 2002) (both
lacking distinct permanent adult caste phenotypes for most
if not all colony members) are functionally non-homologous
with differences between bumblebees and stingless bees
(Kapheim et al., 2015) (both having made the transition
to superorganismality, such that all individuals are either
mated or unmated for life). In both cases, the more elaborate
social system evolved dispersal by swarming to reduce
colony-founding mortality, and both shifts coincided with
transitions from annual semelparity to perennial iteroparous
breeding with much larger colonies. However, dominance
hierarchies became more carefully regulated in the perennial
polistine wasps, while the perennial bees achieved conflict
reduction through the more elaborate domestication of
a single queen by life-time unmated workers (Bourke,
1994; Boomsma et al., 2014; see also Loope, 2015 for an
analogous case in vespine wasps). All colony members
belonging to a single physically differentiated caste for
life changes everything, as does the emergence of animal
soma that is irreversibly differentiated from the germ cell
lineage. This was perfectly transparent to naturalists before
sociobiology took off, as emerges from Williams’s (1966)
seminal monograph Adaptation and Natural Selection, from a
book review by Hamilton (1967), and a host of earlier
contributions (Huxley, 1912, 1930; Fisher, 1930; Lu¨scher,
1953) (Table 2, qE4, qS5, qS8 and qS11).
(3) Initial adaptations to higher levels of
hierarchical complexity are about synergistic
resource acquisition, not reproductive harmony
The co-replicons of complex multicellular organisms
(autosomes, sex chromosomes, and maternally transmitted
cytoplasmic elements) (Cosmides & Tooby, 1981) have
fundamental resource allocation conflicts about sex, sex
ratio, and social behaviour, but never about mechanisms
of resource acquisition, infrastructure maintenance, and
immune defence. In the same way, caste-differentiated
superorganisms lack cross-purpose conflict for higher-level
somatic functions (Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992; Queller &
Strassmann, 2002; Boomsma & Franks, 2006). Traits for
optimizing foraging, nest building, communication, and
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social disease control are therefore free to evolve as complex
‘somatic’ colony-level adaptations that are heritable and
selected at the colony level only (Bonabeau et al., 1997), a
fact already envisaged by Huxley (1912, 1930), Weismann
(1893), Wheeler (1910, 1923, 1928b) and others (e.g.
Table 2, qE1–2, qE4, qS1, qS3, qS5, qS7). However,
this is highly unlikely to happen in facultatively eusocial
dominance hierarchies sensu Crespi & Yanega (1995) (e.g.
Table 2, qS17) where – in spite of colony-life being obligate
(Table 3) – foragers often provision larvae themselves and
genetic heterogeneity within nests will maintain selection for
at least some individual discrimination according to degree
of kin (Strassmann et al., 2002), a process that is generally
absent in superorganisms (Boomsma & d’Ettorre, 2013).
The key significance of separation between resource
acquisition and resource allocation appears to apply in
similar measure when considering adaptive functions of
unicellular cell division versus germ-line reproduction aided
by complex soma. The Metazoa did not become organismal
in the complex unitary soma sense until the origin of the
mesoderm (gastrulation), which separated mouth and gonads
(i.e. resource acquisition and reproductive allocation) during
development and simultaneously cemented unambiguous
germ line sequestration (Barfield et al., 2016). By contrast,
although the prokaryotes and protists may express forms of
simple multicellularity (Fisher et al., 2013), they continue to
experience resource acquisition conflicts over public good
investments, as a plethora of studies have documented
(Diggle et al., 2007; Cordero et al., 2012; Dumas & Kummerli,
2012; Oliveira, Niehus & Foster, 2014; Andersen et al.,
2015; Rendueles et al., 2015). As it appears, conflicts over
resource acquisition are ubiquitous as long as all or
most cell divisions are reproductive rather than somatic
events. Crucially, however, these conflicts disappear after
multicellularity has become obligate with unambiguously
sequestered germ tissues and differentiated soma of maximal
relatedness. This is consistent with complex organismal
plants and animals always needing a period of pure
somatic growth before they can reach sexual maturity,
in the same way as Wheeler-superorganisms need an
ergonomic phase of pure worker production (Oster & Wilson,
1978) before colonies can rear dispersing reproductives.
Thus, neither complex multicellular organisms, nor
Wheeler-superorganisms appear to experience any allocation
conflict that might interfere with growth until they are
sexually mature, and even then the expression of conflict will
not compromise (super)organismal coherence (Table 2, qS2
and qS11).
We have no space here to review all the empirical
evidence, but there appears to be considerable support
for superorganismal colony-level adaptations never being
associated with reproductive allocation. Typical examples
of such adaptations have been discussed by Seeley (1989,
2010), Ho¨lldobler & Wilson (2009), Ratnieks & Reeve (1992),
and others. The following offers a reasonable summary: (i)
honeybee dance language for efficient foraging (Dyer, 2002),
(ii) nest-building and foraging routines, including the complex
communication mechanisms involved (Bonabeau et al., 1997;
Duarte et al., 2011), (iii) thermoregulation and other forms
of active nest environment control (Hansell, 1993), (iv)
additional morphological differentiation of helpers when
evolutionarily derived soldier castes or additional nursing
castes evolve (Wilson, 1971), and (v) social immunity strategies
(Cremer & Sixt, 2009; Tragust et al., 2013). All these examples
concern optimization of resource acquisition, infrastructure
maintenance, public health measures and somatic defence,
and none have any bearing on how or when potential
reproductive conflicts may be expressed or regulated. If this
reasoning is correct it might be possible to develop a formal
reproductive value calculus for Wheeler-superorganisms,
to complement the derivation of a Fisherian fundamental
theorem of multilevel natural selection (Gardner, 2015).
(4) Precise terminology matters because
misnomers breed misunderstanding
It was not until the mid-18th century that Linnaeus
unambiguously categorized the whales as mammals rather
than fishes. This insight was based on the recognition that
all mammals have lungs, warm blood, hair, and produce
live-born offspring that are milk fed (Romero, 2012).
It pre-dates Darwin’s evolutionary assessment of whales
representing a secondary return to marine life by a century.
Today, nobody would question the validity of this taxonomic
split that had been staring naturalists in the face since
the time of Aristotle; aquatic mammals and fish are two
very different things. The sociobiology program (Wilson,
1975) was built upon a heuristic narrative that obscured
equally significant splits in functional taxonomy, using a
lumping approach to force-fit obviously different stages of
social evolution under ‘swimming in the water’ umbrellas
called ‘eusociality’ and sensu lato superorganismality. These
concepts are neither valid taxonomic categories, nor useful
research tools, but arbitrary human constructs. As it appears,
key elements of what some (e.g. Nowak, Tarnita & Wilson,
2010) conceive as a controversy over the validity of inclusive
fitness theory (for responses see Abbot et al., 2011; Boomsma
et al., 2011; Bourke, 2011b; Ferriere & Michod, 2011;
Herre & Wcislo, 2011; Strassmann et al., 2011) emanate
from the fact that Wilson’s (1971) broad definition of
eusociality (Table 2, qE15) glosses over the major transitions
to superorganismality as defined by Wheeler (1911) (Fig. 1).
Against such a misnomer background, it is often impossible
to assess what the phrase ‘the evolution of eusociality’ actually
means. It may be about the very first offspring adopting a
helper role, about discrete defendable nests or colonies,
about castes differing only in behaviour, about physically
differentiated castes, about colonies having a few offspring
with a distinct soldier phenotype, or about an even less
specified form of sensu lato superorganismality. As the inventor
of the term eusociality (Batra, 1995) highlights (Table 2, qE8,
qE14 and qE19), almost anything social can be made to fit
the three sociobiology criteria for eusociality – cooperative
brood care, reproductive division of labour and generation
overlap (see McAuliffe & Whitehead, 2005, for a recent
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example). Papers emerging from this approach often use
all of the aforementioned interpretations of eusociality
interchangeably (e.g. Nowak et al., 2010), which illustrates
that the sociobiology definition of eusociality is a meaningless
panchestron. This term, used by Hardin (1956) to argue that
the concept of protoplasm needed to be abandoned because
it was empty of content, was also applied to dismiss the
Wheeler-superorganism (Table 2, qS12) in the 1960s. This
is somewhat ironic because Wheeler-superorganismality is
a well-defined concept, whereas sociobiological eusociality
continues to be pushed in increasingly meaningless directions
(Table 2, qE23). It would, in fact, not be unreasonable to
conclude that the three-part sociobiological definition of
eusociality which originated in the 1970s has become the
protoplasm of 21st century social evolutionary theory.
The catch-all eusociality definition and its sensu lato
superorganismality companion have even allowed the
suggestion that humans are also ‘eusocial’ (Nowak et al., 2010;
Wilson, 2012). The only reference to support this claim is
an out-of-context mention of a note by Foster & Ratnieks
(2005) suggesting that human menopause is an obligate
altruistic trait. However, their argument has no bearing on
reproductive division of labour or breeding status across
women, because there is no obvious relationship between
life-time reproductive success and age at menopause, not
to mention the fact that human queens are as menopausal
as normal female citizens. Before we even entertain the
possibility of humans matching ants and termites by some
loose analogy, it is important to make explicit that the
universal loss of reproductive totipotency in these social
insects almost always implies life-time commitment of every
colony member to a single core or extended family and
extreme mutual dependency, points elegantly driven home
by Weismann (1893), Wheeler (1902, 1910), Fisher (1930),
and others (Table 2, qS1–3, qS8 and qS11). While such
obligate dependency may be every dictator’s dream, it is
neither a realistic nor a desirable model for human society.
Neither do modern humans have the required monogamous
ancestry; we are rather monogamous compared to our
great-ape sister lineages (Kramer & Russell, 2015), but
nothing that comes even close to the life-time monogamy of
the ancestors of superorganismal social insects (Boomsma,
2007, 2009; Hughes et al., 2008). Writing on this issue
Huxley (1930) captured in a few well-chosen sentences how
misleading it can be for researchers to draw parallels hastily
between insect colonies and human societies (Table 2, qS9),
echoing that Wheeler was right and Spencer was wrong
about the organisms that have evolved superorganismality
(Table 1).
In retrospect, it is surprising how unsuitable the
sociobiological ‘just so’ definitions of eusociality and sensu
lato superorganismality are for obtaining insight into the
fundamentals of social evolution. This contrast is particularly
striking when reflecting on the crystal-clear logic of many
leading authors who wrote about social insects before
sociobiology took off. For example, Weismann (1893) offered
an eloquent 30-page verbal summary of ant biology that we
can hardly do justice to with the three quotations included
(Table 2, qE1, qE2 and qS1). Among other things, he
explained: (i) how families consisting of a single inseminated
queen and her offspring respond to family-level selection
with maximal efficiency; (ii) the factors that impose positive
and relaxed selection on ant colonies; (iii) how co-adaptation
between complementary caste phenotypes is maintained
even when social parasites usurp colonies; (iv) the significance
of worker reproduction and old queens running out of
sperm; and (v) the factors that promote division of labour
and the secondary evolution of soldier castes. Much of this
scholarship was cited or reiterated by Wheeler (1910, 1911,
1923, 1928b) and Huxley (1912, 1930), so it is puzzling
that many of these insights remained unreported when The
Insect Societies (Wilson, 1971) and Sociobiology (Wilson, 1975)
appeared in the 1970s.
The concept of family selection for maximal fertility that
Weismann, Huxley, Wheeler and Fisher used to explain
the evolution and maintenance of physically differentiated
castes (Owen, 2014) (Table 2, qE1–qE4, qS1, qS3 and
qS8) was an elaboration of Darwin’s (1859) explanation
for the evolution of sterile castes in insect colonies. After
Darwinian adaptationist logic and Mendelian genetics had
been synthesized, both Haldane (1932, p. 120) and Sturtevant
(1938) concurred with Fisher’s assessment of family selection,
showing that all three of these leading geneticists were very
explicit in their understanding of permanent reproductively
altruistic castes as the product of selection on genetically
closed families (Table 2, qE5, qE6 and qS8). Although these
statements are consistent with the life-time commitment
principle at colony founding, these early authors also
implicitly assumed, as Darwin must have done (cf . Kirby
& Spence, 1818), that all social insect queens are singly
inseminated, because multiple mating in the honeybee was
first documented about a decade later (Roberts, 1944).
However, when scrutinizing these quotes, their logic never
appears to depend critically on maximal offspring relatedness
being maintained after superorganismality evolved, so
multiple queen mating appears to have become a distraction
until it was realized that, at least in its obligate form, it is
an evolutionarily derived superorganismal trait (Boomsma,
2007, 2009, 2013; Hughes et al., 2008). Also the pioneering
study by Williams & Williams (1957) is based on this closed
family principle. To summarize, it can hardly be emphasized
enough how fundamentally different family selection is from
group selection. As explained in Section III.2, groups are
bottom-up social structures. They come together as chimeric
aggregations or parasocial assemblies that are incapable
of forging major evolutionary transitions, whereas families
are top-down ‘staying together’ pedigrees, which have the
potential to transition to new, higher organizational levels,
albeit under a series of very specific, unlikely, and onerous
conditions (Fig. 3) (see also Boomsma, 2016).
The authors of many social insect papers published since
the 1970s have used Wilsonian eusociality terminology,
assuming that it represented some form, and often the high-
est form, of social organization without worrying about the
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validity of definitions. The first author of this review has been
among them since the 1980s, using the term eusocial when
referring to social insects (usually ants) with physically differ-
entiated castes, but then becoming gradually aware that there
are fundamental problems with the catch-all oversimplified
definition of eusociality. As we show here, Weismann (1893),
Fisher (1930), Haldane (1932), and Hamilton (1964b, 1967)
all contributed erudite interpretations of selection on life-time
committed parents for ergonomic efficiency in family-based
colonies with reproductive and sterile castes. These accounts
either inspired or followed Wheeler (1910, 1923) (Table 2,
qE1, qE2, qE4, qS1 and qS8) but, as mentioned earlier,
almost none of this can be retrieved from the monographs
that established sociobiology (Wilson, 1971, 1975). In its zeal
to turn ants into model systems for understanding social evo-
lution elsewhere, the sociobiology tradition has tried to make
us believe that we can ignore fundamental natural history for
the sake of shallow comparative analogy. It is well known that
early critics maintained that the sociobiology approach was
founded on ‘just so’ stories (Segerstra˚le, 2000). As far as that
critique had merit it has now largely been remedied by solid
hypothesis-driven approaches in the well-established field of
behavioural and evolutionary ecology (e.g. Krebs & Davies,
1978, 1984, 1991, 1997; Trivers, 1985; Cockburn, 1991;
Davies, Krebs & West, 2012) of which sociobiology became
part (Table 1). However, our present analysis exposes that,
for the social insects, the sociobiology research program
was originally based on unfounded ‘just so’ definitions and
arbitrary classification systems, which represents a more
fundamental problem that we here attempt to resolve.
(5) Where to go from here
As we stated in Section I, there are scientific contexts
where the precision of eusociality and superorganismality
terminology does not matter greatly, but it is almost
invariably illuminating to acknowledge Wheeler’s physical
caste criteria for superorganismality, which entails that all
superorganismal colonies had sub-social and Batra-eusocial
ancestors. Huxley (1930) concisely summarized that there
are three main grades of insect social organization: (i) a
lower subsocial family grade with parental care only, (ii)
a middle ‘true social, or colony, grade’ in which adult
offspring cooperate with parents in colonial nest building
and caring for younger siblings, and (iii) a highest caste-based
grade consisting of a fertile reproductive caste and ‘unsexed
neuters’ doing all other tasks (see Table 2, qE4 for the
original formulation). Huxley’s (1930) ‘true social, or colony,
grade’ of organization (Table 1) is the same as Batra’s (1966a)
eusociality, and his entire scheme is almost identical to ours in
the upper part of Table 3. The highest caste-grade identified
by Huxley (1930) corresponds functionally with Wheeler’s
superorganism, which explains why he cites Wheeler’s
insights approvingly throughout his early career (Huxley,
1912, 1930). All other social systems are then best referred
to as forms of cooperative breeding (Crespi & Yanega,
1995)(Fig. 2).
Acknowledging that the origins of superorganismality rely
on universal life-time monogamy and full-sibling family life
makes it explicitly clear that the term superorganism is
inapplicable to vertebrates, which are never monogamous
enough (Boomsma, 2013), and that it should not be
applied to seemingly harmonious open assemblies that
violate the co-replicon principle (Cosmides & Tooby,
1981). Representative examples of untenable superorganism
terminology of the latter kind (Table 2, qN1–qN7) illustrate
how essential it is to have precise and correctly targeted
definitions if we are to understand why some social insect
lineages passed the point of no return to superorganismality,
while other social clades of arthropods and vertebrates
did not (Figs 1 and 2; Table 3). Much precision would
also be gained if biologists would be explicit on whether
they address origins of superorganismality sensu Wheeler
(1911) based on physically differentiated castes, or secondary
(evolutionarily derived and elaborated) superorganismality
as identified by Seeley (1989). However, the Wilsonian sensu
lato version of the superorganism (Ho¨lldobler & Wilson,
2009)(Table 2, qS22 and qS24) needs to be abandoned.
That terminology has confused specialists and non-specialists
alike, has no foundation in Darwinian principles (Weismann,
1893; Wheeler, 1911, 1923; Fisher, 1930), and no obvious
connection to the major transitions framework (Maynard
Smith & Szathma´ry, 1995).
As for eusociality, that term is now so entrenched that there
is no feasible way to restrict its use to small monomorphic
insect families, as Huxley (1930) and Batra (1966a) originally
intended with their essentially identical versions of ‘true
sociality’ (Table 2, qE4, qE8). However, qualifying the term
with the facultative and obligate designations proposed
by Crespi & Yanega (1995) (Fig. 1) goes a long way
towards resolving the problem of having a system for the
classification of social behaviour that is both practical
and biologically meaningful. The adjusted terminology
would be useful because: (i) the identification of systems
with and without physically differentiated reproductives
and workers is almost always straightforward; (ii) the
corresponding facultative–obligate eusociality terminology
captures that there is a fundamental difference between
the cooperative breeding gradient ending with facultative
caste commitment for most colony members and the more
advanced Wheeler-superorganisms (Fig. 2). The former are
societies whose members form reproductive dominance
hierarchies as organisms but remain, as gene pools,
uncommitted to superorganismality. In the latter all colony
members have specialized caste phenotypes for life. Here
colonies are no longer societies because no member has
retained fully independent ‘agency’, and it is therefore
here that unconditional adaptations to higher-level somatic
functions have evolved.
When used properly, inclusive fitness arguments never
aim to explain the origin of artificial behavioural categories,
or any other classifications we impose on the natural
world. Instead, they make testable predictions about how
and why specific traits such as altruistic behaviour or
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physically differentiated caste phenotypes have evolved
(Queller, 1996; Abbot et al., 2011). Sometime in the early
1980s, the fundamental distinction between trying to explain
key social traits rather than an artificially lumped behavioural
classification became opaque when some mistakenly began
to treat Wilsonian eusociality as a trait. Soon after it became
a research agenda to explain the evolution of this reified
category that no one could define in terms that clearly set it
apart from any other social category (cf . Batra, 1995; see also
Table 2, qE14 and qE19). An important insight to emerge
from our analysis is that the commonly asked question,
‘What explains the evolution of eusociality?’ is malformed,
and has no meaningful scientific answer. Without further
qualification, the term is unsuitable for use in the pursuit of
a first-principles understanding of social evolution because
unspecified eusociality cannot respond to any form of natural
selection.
Reinstating coherent definitions, and making them
practically applicable to basic research will benefit the
study of social evolution in multiple ways. Hamilton’s rule
applies across the domains of social evolution, and also
to the fraternal transitions between them during which
relatedness terms cancel out. Yet, the key social traits to
be explained differ fundamentally between the cooperative
breeding and non-caste-committed eusociality domain on
the one hand, and the Wheeler-superorganismal domain on
the other (Fig. 2). This implies that colonies with permanent,
morphologically differentiated castes are as distinct from
those with behavioural ‘castes’ as bilaterian metazoans are
from Dictyostelium slime moulds.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
(1) We have analysed more than a century of scholarly
thinking about superorganismality, and conclude that the
modern versions of the superorganism which arose in the
1980s lack conceptual coherence compared to the original
version that Wheeler (1911) proposed.
(2) We explain that the root cause of these flaws is the
generalized definition of eusociality that came into fashion
when sociobiology took off in the 1970s. This definition
merely emphasized loose similarities in cooperative brood
care, reproductive division of labour and generational
overlap, thereby lumping all social breeders together in
a single convenience category while ignoring the key
significance of the presence or absence of permanent,
physically differentiated queen and worker castes.
(3) We document that early naturalists such as Darwin,
Weismann and Wheeler had a very straightforward
family-selection understanding of social evolution in
genetically closed insect colonies that was accepted by Fisher,
Haldane and Huxley in the 1930s, but disappeared from the
literature in the 1960s, becoming an intellectual fossil deposit
that we recover in this review.
(4) We combine these early insights with recent
developments of inclusive fitness theory and the major
evolutionary transitions paradigm to show that Hamilton’s
rule is sufficient to identify the only known necessary
condition for all irreversible fraternal eukaryote transitions to
complex multicellular organismality and caste-differentiated
superorganismality: life-time commitment by two gametes in
a single organism-founding zygote or a strictly monogamous
royal pair founding an insect colony, i.e. 100% diploid
single-cell bottlenecking, or its triploid/tetraploid analogy in
founding royal pairs of social insect colonies.
(5) We argue that gradual conflict reduction in chimeric
same-generation social aggregations of cells or organisms
has never produced a major transition in evolution, and
cannot be expected to do so either. Both conceptual logic
and comparative data show that such transitions always
require parent-offspring associations with maximal average
sibling relatedness – mathematically identical to parental
relatedness to offspring – so that the relatedness terms to
offspring and siblings cancel out of Hamilton’s rule. In other
words, major transitions in evolution require relatedness
equivalence first and benefit–cost facilitation afterwards, not
the other way around.
(6) In this view, major transitions are simple mathematical
singularities during which offspring relatedness is both
universally maximal and not differentiable (Boomsma, 2007).
Life-time foundation commitments thus imply that major
transitions in evolution do not originate via a dynamic
process of kin-selection because there is no variation in
relatedness when it is always maximal. However, before and
after such irreversible transitions, all three parameters in
Hamilton’s rule vary simultaneously and without priority
for either relatedness or costs/benefits of reproductive
altruism. This implies that social evolution by kin selection
always follows the logic of Hamilton’s rule, but that the
outcomes are fundamentally different in the organismal and
superorganismal domains of social evolution.
(7) We show that the presence of potential reproductive
conflict cannot prevent major transitions to complex
(super)organismality as long as the life-time-commitment
founding principle is upheld as a necessary condition,
and the benefit–cost difference of unconditional altruism
is positive and uninterrupted for the many generations
needed for selection to split developmental pathways into
irreversibly differentiated germ and soma functions. This
is because reproductive conflicts in multicellular organisms
and superorganismal colonies are not about joint resource
acquisition (which provides the key synergy benefits), but
about reproductive resource allocation after, not before
reaching sexual maturity.
(8) We argue that recurrent controversies about the validity
of inclusive fitness theory are, in large part, a result of the
poorly defined sociobiological concepts of eusociality and
superorganismality. Because the sociobiological definition of
eusociality is merely a loose human construct that emphasizes
shallow similarities rather than distinct quantifiable traits, it
is meaningless to ask without further qualification how such
a category evolves. We propose a few simple adjustments
in terminology that will go a long way toward resolving
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these conceptual issues that have been a hindrance to
understanding social evolution from first principles.
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